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This thesis examines the role of the cultural discourse on the indigenous religious
traditions of China and their place within an officially sanctioned construction of Chinese
culture. It starts by examining the concept of culture as it developed in the modern era, its
place within the construction of national identities, and the marginalizing effects this has
on certain members of national populations. Next it turns to the development of the
cultural discourse within China from the mid-1800s to the Cultural Revolution,
highlighting the social and legal transformations as they restricted and reframed the
practice and articulation of religious traditions in mainland China. Following these early
articulations of a cultural discourse in China and the subjugation of religious traditions to
secular standards of legitimation, it examines the official presentations and
governmentally sanctioned forms of the Daoist tradition in post-Mao China during a
“cultural revival,” through an analysis of official publications and online presentations.
Finally, it examines the way teachers and administrators package Chinese culture for a
foreign audience through the Confucius Institute.
This thesis argues that, despite greater freedom to explore indigenous traditions
previously written off as “superstitious” within the cultural revival of contemporary
China, the official cultural discourse in China continues to operate within the parameters
of a modern cultural identity that marginalizes ritualistic forms of religion, allowing these
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religious forms to survive in an official space only as exotic images, sanitized and
secularized activities, or ethical ideals.
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INTRODUCTION
“Because without destruction there can be no construction….What, then,
is the way to effect our salvation and to achieve progress? The answer is
that we must shatter at a blow the despotic and confused governmental
system of some thousands of years; we must sweep away the corrupt and
sycophantic learning of these thousands of years.” - Liang Qichao, “On
Progress.”1
“The second comrade tosses it off by asking in return ‘What is the value of
culture?’ Production and food and building roads are important. ‘It is no
harm to remove some ancient relics and to use some old Buddhas as
scrap.’”2
“Now, ‘foreigners come in our temples, take photographs of the idols,
show these photographs to each other and laugh.’” - Kang Youwei.3
Iconoclasts took the helm of national cultural construction in the beginning of the
20th century. The defining question was indeed, “What is the value of culture?” and it
remains one of the prominent questions in contemporary China. When various
intellectuals and political leaders asked this question in the early 20th century, it referred
predominantly to the various religious traditions that had formed the backbone of Chinese
intellectual, political, and social institutions throughout Chinese history. Did the
Confucian tradition provide an adequate basis for creating a strong and modern China?
Were the local deities distracting and weakening the Chinese people? If these traditions
contained aspects that did not fit in a modern cultural identity, did they have anything to
offer the new Chinese nation?

1

Liang Qichao, “On Progress,” Sources of Chinese Tradition: from 1600 through the twentieth century,
vol. 2, 2nd ed., eds. Wm Theodore de Bary and Richard Lufrano, (New York: Columbia University Press,
2000), 292-3. Hereafter, citations from de Bary attributed to Sources of Chinese Tradition.
2
Richard C. Bush, Jr. Religion in Communist China (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), 328. Hereafter
Bush, Religion in Communist China.
3
Vincent Goossaert and David Palmer. The Religious Question in Modern China (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2011), 46. Hereafter Goossaert, Religious Question.
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Looking at the modern history of China, the notions of cultural identity and
cultural transformation have played an outsized role. Two of the most significant
movements in the last century employed the term in their names: the New Culture
Movement and the Cultural Revolution. The first of these movements was the high-point
of the early cultural discourse and sought to imagine a new national identity for the
Chinese nation in the modern era. These thinkers advocated iconoclasm, creating violent
rupture with the old regimes and structures of authority and knowledge. But their actions
struck at religious institutions that had provided sources of authority, hope, and comfort
in Chinese society in the eras preceding. Thus, many people in China at the time
disagreed with the radical nature of the changes that early communists and nationalists
proposed. One response to iconoclastic regulations during the early years of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) despaired, crying out, “Spirits, spirits! I am not the one who
wants to move you. It is the cadres who want to do so.”4 The political authorities were
imposing upon all citizens of China a new secular culture divested from divinity that
benefited their claims to secular political authority. Fighting a battle over hearts and
minds, party newspapers often proclaimed victory, such as in a 1966 article at the start of
the Cultural Revolution stating, “After two or three years of tireless efforts, they at last
caused the witches and sorcerers themselves to smash up the altars and throw the clay
idols onto the field as fertilizer.”5
As indicated by this quote, it took concerted effort, both in the intellectual and
legal spheres, to eliminate the old structures of belief tied to various religious traditions
and impose the new cultural ideology. But the efforts to instate a modern culture are best
4
5

Bush, Religion in Communist China, 399.
Bush, Religion in Communist China, 417.

-2-

seen as a continuing effort that operates in dialectic between voices advocating aspects of
traditional culture and those advocating their complete elimination. Thus, even at the
height of the Cultural Revolution, an elderly lady in China was quoted saying, “Last year
was the lucky year of Chairman Mao, and the Old Man in Heaven and the God of Wealth
were chased away. This year Chairman Mao is declining, so the God of Wealth came
back to its proper place.”6 The reinstatement of old divinities within contemporary
Chinese society is once again underway, termed a “Cultural Revival,” but with the
changing times the role of religion in China is constantly renegotiated and repositioned,
never quite the same as it was previously.
Today, the Chinese state has moved on from the most radical actions that fought
to break with old cultural forms and establish a completely new communist cultural
hegemony. But given the varied forms of traditional culture involved in the cultural
revival today and the varied audiences for this revival, exactly how are these old cultural
forms being revived and what are the conditions of revival? The conditions guiding the
revival of religious systems in contemporary China and the effects these conditions have
on official presentations of traditional Chinese culture are the subject of this thesis.
In order to examine the way the cultural discourse operates in official
presentations of Chinese religions today, I will examine the publications and activities of
the Chinese Taoist Association (CTA) within China and the Confucius Institutes (CIs)
abroad.7 I have selected the CTA because the Daoist tradition faced the most difficulty

6

Bush, Religion in Communist China, 422.
This thesis will refer to the Zhongguo Daojiao Xiehui 中国道教协会 as the Chinese Taoist Association.
Other names include the China Taoist Association, the Chinese Daoist Association, and the Taoist
Association of China. The last is their official english translation provided in their charter, however,
because most English-language newspapers have refered to them as the Chinese Taoist Association, it is
this translation that I adopt. I will use the terms Daoist and Daoism rather than Taoist and Taoism
7
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fitting within the modern Chinese culture due to its links to various superstitious
activities and yet today relies heavily upon the cultural discourse to advocate its place in
contemporary China as a source of the best aspects of traditional Chinese culture. I
selected the CI because it represents the most polished presentation of Chinese culture
organized through the Chinese state and given preference in international presentations
thereof.
I will analyze the cultural presentations of these organizations in context of the
development of a cultural and religious discourse in China since the mid-1800s,
compared against the history of these traditions, their statistical realities, and
ethnographic accounts of other scholars in contemporary China. I source the official
presentation of Daoism within a discourse of Chinese culture from news articles,
publications by official state organs such as the Religious Affairs Bureau and the State
Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), the official websites of the CTA, and
official English-language publications by the CTA, in an effort to see what they view as
legitimate culture and what they place outside of the official Daoist tradition. My account
of the CI presentations is informed by ethnographic work with CI teachers and cultural
events in the United States. Taking into account cultural theory and post-colonial
criticism, I will highlight aspects of religious traditions that are left out of these
presentations and the rhetorical strategies that eliminate certain individuals and activities
from the officially sanctioned Chinese culture.
In Chinese modernity, the discourse of culture was defined by iconoclastic
regimes that fed into a larger movement of so-called anti-clericalism or anti-superstition.

throughout as these conform to the current pinyin transliteration, but the other spellings will appear in
quotations and the title of the organization.
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Those who held power defined the parameters of the discourse, namely those within the
government and those in places of higher authority inside the legitimized tradition. In the
contemporary religious and cultural revival in China individuals utilize a safe space of
“traditional culture” to legitimize their existence. In this thesis I will argue that, despite
greater freedom to explore these traditions previously written off as “superstitious,” the
modern discourse of Chinese culture marginalizes these religions in the official discourse
and this results in a sanitized and limited discussion of what religion, particularly
Daoism, can be for the legitimate actors within the national and global discourse. Some
activities get sanctioned while others are nearly impossible to even discuss. The official
cultural discourse in China continues to operate within the parameters of a modern
cultural identity that maintains an instrumental, functionalist view of religious traditions
for social welfare and marginalizes ritualistic forms of religion, allowing these religious
forms to survive only as exotic images, sanitized and secularized activities, or ethical
ideals.
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CHAPTER 1: CULTURAL THEORY
Origins of Cultural Theory
Roy Wagner claims in half jest that, “We could define an anthropologist as
someone who uses the word ‘culture’ habitually.”1 Beyond the anthropologist, today we
all use the word culture habitually, and yet the use of this term is nearly unbounded by
any agreed upon content. In my usage of the term culture means generally a broad system
of meanings and meaning-making devices enacted by people and informed by history.
Keeping in mind this definition and the complications of such an open term, this chapter
will examine the origins and implications of this term. In the case of both objects of this
study, the Confucius Institute and the Chinese Taoist Association, this term ‘culture’ is of
central importance to the legitimacy of their organizations and activities. The term itself
grants a certain legitimacy for these organizations because all have accepted the value of
culture, even if (or possibly in virtue of the fact that) there is no agreed upon definition of
the term or its content. Despite the term’s fuzziness, understanding the origins of and
motivations for using this term will help analyze its usage today by official Chinese
organizations.
A question that ought to be asked before embarking on the analysis of a particular
term is whether that term is significant in and of itself to make a marked change in the
circumstances of a discourse. The question is, does the term ‘culture’ play a different role
in discussing the ideas or activities of a community than previous terms? Put differently,
could people have been discussing culture without having the term for culture? People
could have been talking about culture prior to the incorporation of the term into the

1

Roy Wagner, The Invention of Culture: revised and expanded edition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1981), 1.
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discourse as such.2 This chapter will argue that the term itself opens up opportunities to
intellectuals and political actors, in China and around the world, which the previous terms
did not make available and has resulted in new forms of structural violence and
motivations for political oppression of individuals within national and religious
communities.3
Culture was a concept developed in the West to accommodate new goals and
changing circumstances within political and social thought, particularly during the
Enlightenment in the eighteenth century but developing in the preceding century as well.
As William Ray puts it, “All of the structural mutations that lead to the gradual
emergence of ‘culture’ as a logic involve changes in orders of magnitude.”4 While there
were terms used to discuss aspects or components of a culture, with the gradual
positioning of culture as the central term in the discourse a conversation became easier to
have, with all arguing about and imagining the composition of society in ways which
were markedly different from ideas prior to cultural theory.
Ray points to Utopia by Thomas More to argue that in the early sixteenth century
it was becoming possible to see members of a social group at any level as capable of
determining values and rules for that group, rather than the ruling classes or a religious
authority. This democratization of authority is a key aspect of the idea of culture, where
the collective opinions and customs of a group have a determinative capacity and are
2

This is the warning that Inglis cites Quentin Skinner giving when he argues, “it cannot be a necessary
condition for my possessing a concept that I need to understand the correct application of a corresponding
term.” Fred Inglis. Culture (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 4.
3
It is this impact of terms to create new orientations and produce new actions which Scott talks about in
Refashioning Futures as “productive spaces” or “problem-spaces” created by the terms of the discourse, in
particular nationalism. David Scott, Refashioning Futures: criticism after postcoloniality (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999), 96.
4
William Ray. The Logic of Culture: Authority and Identity in the Modern Era (Malden: Blackwell,
2001), 17. Hereafter Ray, Logic of Culture.
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acknowledged to have this power. Culture in this way is also and has always been a
politically disruptive idea and is in many ways tied to the development of democratic
values. More’s writings contained seeds of the values that bore fruit with the
development of the burgeoning cultural theory.
The idea of culture formed during the age of exploration when people of
European states began to travel broadly, and this fostered unprecedented interaction
between different groups of people. Cultural theory is fundamentally a product of
confronting an ‘other’ and seeing this group operating to a different set of customs and
forming a different society, looking for reason and logic within these foreign groups and
attempting to fit them into a larger understanding of one’s own background. A wide
variety of European individuals set out—including scientists, anthropologists, merchants,
military men, and missionaries—each with their own motivations, but all had to
encounter and conceptualize new peoples and places. This meant that the conceptions
around culture were always about those whom one knew and understood, sharing a
similar background and customs, and those whom one did not know or understand.
In conceiving this difference, the two concepts of culture and civilization stand in
opposition. Civilization was a term, arising in France in the 1750s and spreading quickly
from there, that positioned all ways of living into a progressive, linear arrangement
ending in the highest level of organization and the best customs. In this way, as Sahlins
notes, “‘civilization’ was not pluralizable: it did not refer to distinctive modes of
existence of different societies but to the ideal order of human society in general.”5
Culture, on the other hand, generally carried with it the notion of difference, possibly of

5

Marshall Sahlins. How ‘Natives’ Think: About Captain Cook, for Example (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996), 10-1.
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preference, but not of progression. It was in stark contrast to the idea of civilization, even
if the two terms often were interchanged in common speech. Cultures were insular,
‘islands’ of being and knowledge and at least in theory they ought to be respected. This
view was more prevalent in the anthropological discourse as social scientists attempted to
be more ‘objective’ and ‘respectful’ of the people whom they studied. Thus recent
scholarship still uses this idea that, quoting Geertz, “[u]nderstanding a people’s culture
exposes their normalness without reducing their particularity.”6 If one can begin to see a
group as normal this is a step towards respect and appreciation.
Given that cultures were insular modes of existence and interpretation as social
groups, discussing cultures implies people having membership and a sense of belonging
within this identity. This turns cultural discourse into one of belonging or exclusion and
allows some aspects of the discourse to focus on identifying those who fit within the
group (insiders) and those who belong to a different group (outsiders). As Inglis puts it,
“Applied to culture, this maxim defines a culture, whatever else it is, as circumscribable
and exclusive and, consequently, as ascribing to those members an unmistakable and
unshakable identity.”7 Put to use, this way of conceptualizing a group can work to unite a
group and give it pride in this identity, often tied to perceived fundamental ‘values,’ an
idea which we will come back to repeatedly in our examinations of the nationalist
cultural discourse discussed below.8 The necessary corollary of this is the possible

6

Clifford Geertz. The Interpretation of Cultures (USA: Basic Books, 1973), 14.
Inglis, Culture, 14.
8
For a discussion of group identity around values, see Ted Cantle, Community Cohesion: A New
Framework for Race and Diversity (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 77-8. Hereafter, Cantle,
Community Cohesion. See also, Marc Howard Ross. Culture and Belonging in Divided Societies:
Contestation and Symbolic Landscapes (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 3.
7
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exclusion from a cultural group or the use of cultural criticism to manipulate or denigrate
a group of people.
These distinct groupings of people with common customs and conceptions will
thus require an initiation of sorts into the group, a process of ‘acculturation’ after which
one would presumably fit into the culture. Geertz cites Ward Goodenough as saying, “A
society’s culture… consists of whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to
operate in a manner acceptable to its members.”9 While this is a deceptively simplistic
and problematic idea of culture, it gets at the idea that despite all its varied meanings,
culture is something that is learned from the group and, much like language, can be
mastered from birth or learned later through analysis and study. Further, like language, if
one does not understand the culture, one can never fully understand the group with which
one is interacting.
Geertz puts the definition of culture simply, saying that man’s culture is the “webs
of significance he himself has spun.”10 Geertz then argues that the key to developing an
understanding of culture is to analyze the “historically transmitted pattern of meanings
embodied in symbols… by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop
their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.”11 One can, through observation and
interaction, come to an understanding of a different way of understanding the world, one
which stands apart from one’s own by virtue of a separate history and which contains
within it different ways of knowing and feeling about the world. Focusing on story rather
than symbol, Inglis argues that culture is the “provision of narratives to live within and

9

Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 11.
Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 5.
11
Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 89.
10
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purposes to live for.”12 Regardless of the narrative, linguistic, or symbolic method of
discussing culture, the undergirding of inherited meaning and the means of producing
one’s own meaning form the center of the term culture. Understanding culture as
compiled and established in society through historical processes, this cultural discourse
has identified some of the key means by which to not only understand a culture, but also
the components which can be manipulated to change a culture.
Culture as National Identity; Culture and Politics
Early cultural theorists and anthropologists saw culture as opposed to or outside
of politics, with ‘primitive societies’ peaceful to the same degree that they did not need
politics.13 Imagining utopias always placed these peaceful and perfected places in a
distant place or time ‘beyond politics’ because “politics is struggle and culture is
harmony.”14 However, given the political arguments embodied by utopian ideals and the
othering of these whole people groups, it is important to realize how truly political these
theories of culture were from the start.
The understanding that I advance about culture shares much in common with the
ideas cited above for cultures as systems of meanings and meaning-making enacted by
people and informed by history. However, following thinkers like Asad and other postcolonial theorists, I hold that it is important to focus primarily on the way in which these
systems are enacted, manipulated, and changed through argumentation and power. In this
sense, politics and culture are not separate and no group of people acts without some

12

Inglis, Culture, 39.
Inglis, Culture, 31. Specifically addressing Tylor’s 1871 work Primitive Cultures: “Living in culture,
primitive peoples had no politics.”
14
Inglis, Culture, 30-1. For further discussion of utopian fictions at this time placed onto real maps, see
Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New
York: Verso, 2006), 69. Hereafter Anderson, Imagined Communities.
13
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form of politics. The term ‘post-colonial’ draws from the response to colonial discourses,
which attempted to categorize colonial subjects and by means of this regulate their
activities. Tejaswini Niranjana defines colonial discourse as “the body of knowledge,
modes of representation, strategies of power, law, discipline, and so on, that are
employed in the construction and domination of the ‘colonial subjects.’”15 While China
was not specifically a colonial subject, the incorporation of these discourses was
influential to the way Chinese nationalists and intellectuals conceived of their own
traditions in years to come, and thus some have described this process of continuing
influence on cultural understandings as an “absentee colonialism.”16
The political nature of cultural theory is important to remember in particular
because political thinkers utilized the discourse of culture to engage in cultural
construction as part of national construction. Thinkers like Marx, Trotsky, Mussolini, and
Gramsci utilized these terms to turn culture into a new political weapon, one which was
also utilized in China during the late Qing and early national period starting at the end of
the 19th century, and up to the present day. Like the shift mentioned above in the work of
Thomas More and those to follow, public opinion and democratically established ideas of
‘the people’ created the ground for arguing against a monarchy divinely established and
for a democratic nation supported by the voice of the public.17

15

Tejaswini Niranjana, Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial Context
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), cited in Lydia H. Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature,
National Culture, and Translated Modernity—China, 1900-1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1995), 23. Hereafter Liu, Translingual Practice.
16
Johannes Fabian. Time and the Other: how anthropology makes its object (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983), 69.
17
Inglis, Culture, 34.
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The creation of a popular ethic, the value undergirding the possibility of talking
about culture in the first place, was central to constructing national identities. While the
construction of a nation may not necessarily follow the acceptance of the idea of culture,
all nations utilize this idea. Nations seek to construct an identity that is “both soul and
body at once,”18 both the people and their values, which is founded on “the possession in
common of a rich legacy of memories… [and] the present-day consent, the desire to live
together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an
undivided form.”19 This memory and heritage is one way to speak of a cultural identity,
imagined as bounded by specific national borders.20 The components of this identity were
created and pieced together at specific points in time, even as members of these national
cultures often overlook their relative recent provenance. Those who crafted a nationalcultural identity, as Plamenatz argues, did so “to preserve or enhance a people’s national
or cultural identity when that identity is threatened, or…to transform or even create it
where it is felt to be inadequate or lacking.”21 Drawing in interesting ways from both
cultural and civilizational theories, nationalists foster both a distinct identity and a drive
towards cultural progress into equality with other modern nations.
Plamenatz, speaking of nationalism in general, sums up well the “two rejections”
that happened during the early years of revolution in China, starting in the late 19th

18

Ernst Renan. “What is a nation?” Notion and Narration, ed. Homi Bhabha. (New York: Routledge,
1990), 18. Hereafter Renan, “What is a Nation.”
19
Renan, “What is a Nation,” 18-9.
20
For a discussion of the unification of a cultural identity with a national identity, see Cantle, Community
Cohesion, 87. See also, Andrea Louie. Chineseness Across Borders: renegotiating Chinese identities in
China and the United States (London: Duke University Press, 2004), 51-3. Hereafter Louie, Chineseness
Across Borders.
21
John Plamenatz. “Two Types of Nationalism,” Nationalism: the nature and evolution of an idea, ed.
Eugene Kamenka (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973), 23-4.
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century and peaking in the 1910s, in an effort to become a modern nation. Intellectuals
argued for the “rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is nevertheless to be
imitated and surpassed by his own standards, and rejection of ancestral ways which are
seen as obstacles to progress and yet also cherished as marks of identity.”22 Thus they are
rejecting an external and an internal threat, one threatening sovereignty, one threatening
progress. It is in this way that the discourse of culture and nationalism have determined
the grounds for legitimacy of many of the religious institutions within Chinese culture
since the turn of the 20th century.
Given the vastness of culture, nationalists and cultural theorists attempt to create a
conception within which all ‘insiders’ can fit, and thus culture is “a strategy for
understanding in dialectical terms, and thus legitimating as reciprocals of each other, the
competing imperatives of social order and individual freedom, hierarchy and mobility,
continuity and change, law and choice.”23 This way of thinking about social identity is a
constant struggle to operate within the parameters of the cultural discourse in an effort to
define its limits. The identity of a group of people is intrinsically linked to the various
component parts that constitute a culture as well as the way in which they are spoken
about.24
Because authoritative interpretations of culture, often those advanced by those in
power or government, determine the parameters of the term and how it functions in
society, a key aspect to examine is the construction of parameters for discussion and
criticism. Asad notes that the enlightenment project of Kant divided the world along lines

22

Plamenatz, “Two Types of Nationalism,” 34.
Ray, Logic of Culture, 6-7.
24
See Talal Asad. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 31-2. Hereafter Asad, Genealogies of Religion.
23
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of obedience to authority and rational criticism or argumentation using the distinction
between the public and private roles of individuals. Asad argues that there are two limits
placed on such criticism: “a sociological limit (the literate, scholarly minority to whom
the privilege of public criticism belongs) and a political one (the conditions in which one
must refrain from open criticism).”25 Nationalists and reformers in China played within
these limits and also defined these limits when in power. They advocated the use of
vernacular literary forms to expand the sociological limits of criticism and when in power
established limits on what could be said or done without punishment. Within this
construction of public voices are the quite obvious denial of some voices and the use of
force and politics to accomplish this silencing. Legal parameters were put in place to
establish and maintain cultural forms that gained ascendancy in this period of national
construction.
The argument and struggle over identity can be structural but also bloody and
revolutionary, as it was at various points from the French Revolution onward. Culture is
the grounds upon which national identities get argued and the manipulation of these
cultural identities factored into all the nationalist, fascist, or communist discourses.
Political thinkers and intellectuals were arguing against the old structures they no longer
wanted in favor of new social structures. The terms that mapped onto the old ways of
acting were “custom, prejudice and superstition” which “became blanket terms for
designating any form of social practice — such as respect for the clergy or the nobility —
that seems to have no basis of authority other than that of tradition.”26 These terms
became weapons to eliminate certain cultural components within reforming countries,
25
26

Asad, Genealogies of Religion, 204.
Ray, Logic of Culture, 16.

- 15 -

China being no exception. Below we will see the playing out of struggles to find a space
within the parameters of a discourse characterized by terms such as superstition and the
way that positions individuals, their beliefs and actions, outside of protection or support
by other members of society.
In the following examinations of religion as a Chinese cultural component, I
provide a view into how different forms of religious practice were left outside the
authorized, legitimized space of religion in modern China and remain there to this day.
This perspective shares affinities with the post-colonial perspective which “bears witness
to those countries and communities — in the North and the South, urban and rural —
constituted… ‘otherwise than modernity.’”27 The notion, starting all the way back in the
early 16th century, of a ‘people’ who constitute some whole and who have a collective
voice needs to be challenged.28 The people is not and has never been a unified entity but
rather by arguing for the construction of a citizenry or popular sovereignty the issue has
always been one of argument for or against various ways of being, played out in a field of
unequal power and exerted force. What follows is a history of the victorious cultural
authors, the ones who determined or fit within the modern national identity. What should
be remembered are those who sit uncomfortably outside or on the margins of this identity
and the force that was exerted militarily and discursively to push certain actors out onto
the illegitimate margins, an effort that continues to this day.

27

Homi K. Bhabha. The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2010), 9.
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CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS
DISCOURSE
Reinterpreting an Ancient Culture
While the idea of culture developed initially in the European nations it became
incredibly important, through translation and re-imaginings, for the intellectuals and
revolutionaries in China during the 19th and 20th centuries. In order to examine the
contemporary manifestations of this discourse to present a Chinese identity for a foreign
audience, it is first important to see the roots of this discourse in China as intellectuals
and political leaders tried to modernize and re-imagined Chinese cultural identity. There
were many strains of the cultural discourse in China through the late Qing dynasty in the
19th century and under the national regimes in China during the 20th century. Below I
will present a range of voices in an attempt to show the contours of the debate, the terms
of tension, and the relation of these discourses to authoritative power structures. Noting
the development and contestation of the national cultural identity within China from the
1840s through the early days of the Chinese nation in the 1960s, in this chapter I will
argue that the cultural discourse positioned religious traditions on the margins of society
and defined their proper forms in a way that did violence to members of these traditions
and dramatically changed their forms in Chinese society. In what follows I will
emphasize the repositioning of religion outside of politics and authority structures in
Chinese society as a product of the efforts to create a secular national identity tied to
modernist notions of progress and rationality.
Chinese culture did not exist as such prior to the 19th century. By this I mean only
that the term itself was not defined. After interaction with Westerners, new conceptual
divisions and discourses offered a new chance to define many of the institutions and
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practices of Chinese culture. Some powerful concepts entering China at the time were
human rights, religion, philosophy, superstition, nationalism, culture, and civilization,
none of which was used prior to this period in Chinese understandings. It is the
intersection of these ideas and the stances towards them that key individuals took that
shaped and continue to shape the religious policies and presentations of the Chinese
nation to this day.
The necessity of defining one’s cultural identity arises when outside cultures are
met and continued interactions highlight differences. While there were notions of an
ethnic identity which occasionally arose when outside kingdoms ruled over the Han state
or through interactions with so-called ‘barbarian’ states, the notion of a cultural identity
arose more fully with the arrival of the terms for ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’ in the 19th
century. Liu argues that, “In its earlier usage, wenhua [culture] denoted the state of wen
or artistic cultivation in contrast to wu or military prowess. The new ethnographic notion
of wenhua did not enter the Chinese language until after bunka, the Japanese kanji
translational equivalent of ‘culture,’ was borrowed back by the Chinese at the turn of the
twentieth century.”1 As Wang Gungwu explains the term, it carried with it notions of
literature or written heritage (wen 文) and the capacity to change others or dynamism (hua
化).2 The choice of this term could be viewed as relating to Chinese cultural identity
specifically because of its long literate history and the Chinese people’s belief that their
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culture had the capacity to change the cultures of its neighbors, while the Chinese culture
itself did not undergo influence from outside.3
In the mid-19th century in China, the idea of culture was paired with the idea of
civilization. While both terms conveyed the above senses, culture was largely value
neutral and all groups were seen to have it, whereas civilization was used to describe the
position of a group at the top of a chain of historical and cultural development. More
traditional Confucian understandings of history emphasized a looking back to great men
in history and attempting to re-establish the ways of the past. Buddhist ideas of history
were more cyclical and based on the presence and disappearance of the Buddha and
Dharma in the world. With the arrival of Western notions of progress and enlightenment
came the idea that history was one of movement forward on a chain of development on
which all peoples and cultures could be positioned. As Wang Gungwu puts it, “A new
word that brought out the universality of the phenomenon was needed and wen-ming
[文明, civilization] was adopted.”4 While cultures all had some value, the term civilization
was applied to those that had a higher level of development and more to offer to other
cultures. This was a push towards modernity and what values constituted a ‘civilized’ and
‘modern’ society were debated throughout the late 19th century, all the way through to the
founding of the Chinese nation in 1949 and continue to this day.
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Chinese Cultural Discourse in the late Qing
At the fall of the Ming Dynasty the Chinese faced some difficult issues of identity
and legitimacy. Many literati officials were trying to understand why their empire had
fallen, how to react to the foreign rule by Manchus, and also dealing with the arrival of
foreign missionaries and merchants. In response to these problems of political
sovereignty and outsider presence, later thinkers would begin to question Chinese cultural
traditions in a broad way as an explanation for national failings, but at this time those
terms were not available and literati officials who held power and attempted to institute
reforms did so through indigenous, Confucian terms. The literati who took the most
active role in this discussion of reform initially focused on orthodoxy, an indigenous
notion of change, and a conception of fundamental difference with the ‘barbarians’ to
explain what had just happened and imagine a future course of action.
Writings from this time show a common theme amongst reform thinkers that
officials and, in particular, the rulers of the day had failed to live up to the ways of the
ancient sages. Due to hereditary rule, kings and princes ruled out of selfishness and did
not listen to their ministers. The emperor had done away with the prime minister, and
those ministers that remained were powerless or too fearful to properly direct the ruler.
Thus, Huang Zongxi, the 17th century literati political agitator and author, argued, “The
origin of misrule under the Ming lay in the abolition of the prime ministership by [the
founder] Gao Huangdi”5 and the ministers could only “draft comments of approval and
disapproval [on memorials] just like court clerks…. Could you say that they had real
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power?”6 These comments indicate that one problem that literati officials and reformers
identified which led to the fall of an empire and the subjugation of the Chinese people to
foreign rulers was that the right people were not given the ability to speak and those with
institutional power did not listen to those who could have saved the empire.
Arguments for institutional change sound simply political and could simply be
about putting into practice the proper structures of governance. However, it is important
to recognize that the Chinese thinkers at this time had no distinction between secular and
sacred, no idea of political as contrary to religious, and thus morality and cosmology
were tied intimately to questions of political legitimacy. The arguments and concerns of
these scholars are rooted in the rectifying of heterodox practices or teachings and solving
the failings of the rulers to live up to Confucian teachings. These arguments could be
seen as utilizing religious concerns about moral relationships rooted in Heaven. Most of
the literati wanted to establish proper relationships based upon neo-Confucian
understandings. For instance, Lu Liuliang explains the fall of the empire, saying, “Cut off
from Heaven, rulers did not understand that rites come from Heaven, ministers did not
realize that fidelity [loyalty] is rooted in the moral nature, that the nature is Heaven, that
Heaven is the moral imperative [and political mandate], that it is principle, and the nature
is principle.”7 These suggested causes for the fall of an empire were traditional critiques
of a failed dynasty, yet their use of the idea of a Heavenly authority shows one way that
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Confucian understandings of legitimacy would play into a potential religious argument
once foreign ideas of religion arrived through missionaries and merchants.
Reformers at this time also found their voice in Confucian understandings found
in such sources as the Book of Changes and used this language of change. For instance,
Wang Fuzhi, a Ming loyalist and prolific writer, wrote in the mid-1600s, “When one
accords with the times, one complies with that which the times make inevitable in order
to save oneself and so escape from disaster…. The ancient institutions were for governing
the ancient world and cannot be taken as general rules applicable in the present…”8 This
argument for institutional change rooted in Confucian understandings was influential
amongst the Self-Strengthening movement starting in the mid-19th century because it
created a space for a strong Confucian identity while also allowing for change. However,
contrary to later conceptions discussed below, the rhetoric of change did not yet have any
of the modern notions of progress upon a linear timeline, tied to separations of the
rational and irrational, the religious and superstitious. The changes that needed to be
made were not framed as a sloughing off of old ideas that had passed their time, but
rather a re-establishing of principles rooted in Heaven.
As these discussions indicate, Chinese reformers were looking to indigenous
conceptions and indigenous solutions. They did have a notion of the ‘other,’ but this
group did not have any authoritative, legitimate voice, and it was not yet a source of
solutions. Wang Fuzhi writes of the difference between barbarians and Chinese, rooting
his argument in what could be termed an environmental determinism that precludes
foreign legitimacy. He says, “Since their climates are different, so too are their habits,
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and consequently all they know and all they do is different...”9 His arguments do not
address specifics in the teachings of the barbarians nor does he show interest in learning
from them. The barbarians are to be kept distinct and “the Chinese cannot be put in the
same category as the barbarians” if they do not want to violate the categories of
Heaven.10 Without specific reasons other than that the foreigners were overly concerned
with trade and came from a different place, Wang Fuzhi keeps a traditional understanding
of Chinese superiority. Seen above, at this point there is a concern with customs and an
argument around something similar to culture, which provides fodder for many
nationalist thinkers including Mao Zedong, yet it is not conceived of in those terms.
This general lack of concern over foreign teachings was the norm for much of the
early Qing. Foreign teachings came through Catholic missionaries at first and yet
Confucian structural hegemony in education and advancement made the foreign
teachings largely irrelevant. Christians talked of salvation but they also brought advanced
knowledge of astronomy and mathematics. Yet even these skills were not immediately
relevant or practical to many. Taking a pragmatic view of the teachings brought by the
Jesuits, most literati still gave preference to the Confucian traditions that would help with
official advancement. As de Bary notes, “The Jesuits themselves, from the outset,
observed that the general disinterest of the Chinese in Western science was a reflection of
their preoccupation with studies that led to official preferment.”11 While education and
official positions were determined by traditional learning, the knowledge offered by
Jesuits was of little importance, whether it be scientific or religious. What mattered more
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was the examination system for advancement based upon Confucian tradition and the
official system of ancestor worship granting local authority and tied ultimately to the
state cult.
For those who did take interest in the teachings of the barbarians, either as
converts or concerned Confucians, the question was their relation to traditional teachings
which still stood largely unquestioned. An early convert Li Zhizao, talking of Matteo
Ricci’s teachings, said, “Particularly in respect to his emphasis on the great importance of
knowing and serving Heaven, what he says tallies with the classics and commentaries.”12
Christianity was mapped onto traditional ideas of serving Heaven and the Lord of
Heaven, and judged by Confucian standards of morality. This means that, like the
concerns of the Pope and missionaries engaging in Chinese practices of ancestor or idol
worship, the main concern was not a cultural one per se. Rather, the concern was over
orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the traditional standards during the late-Imperial period for
prohibition of various ‘religious’ practices.
Birth of a Cultural Discourse: Learning from the Barbarians
With the failings of the Chinese state to defend its interests against foreign
economic interests during the First and Second Opium wars and the nefarious impacts of
the opium trade, Chinese thinkers started to consider certain foreign technologies and
understandings superior or in need of study. As Tu Wei-ming has put it, Chinese
intellectuals felt they had gone “from the master of the Middle Kingdom to the slave of
the West.”13 The expansion of discussions to wider political or cultural appropriation was
best shown in the arguments surrounding the Self-Strengthening movement and its call to
12
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incorporate Western science and military learning. The debate lasted many decades and
many contributed to this re-imagining of Chinese culture, questioning various interrelated
fields including political institutions, educational structure, religious values, and social
norms. Debates were held in court, but there was also a widening public venue of
discussion such as intellectual societies similar to salons and a burgeoning print culture.14
With the questioning of all of these cultural forms related to the Confucian tradition, the
debate expanded to a true questioning of Chinese culture as such.
Everyone agreed that they wanted the barbarian authority gone, particularly in the
foreign concessions, but most agreed it could not be done by sticking to principles and
classical education methods. While there were many conservative responses that sought
to reaffirm Confucian orthodoxy and dismiss the foreigners, particularly seen in the
views of the leading Confucian literati-official Woren,15 the voices that won out were the
Self-Strengtheners. A representative statement comes from Feng Guifen, saying, “When
we speak of repelling the barbarians, we must have the actual means to repel them, and
not just empty bravado…. [The answer is that] we should use the instruments of the
barbarians but not adopt the ways of the barbarians. We should use them so that we can
repel them.”16
This discussion of the “ways of the barbarians” shows an appreciation of the
difference between the West and China in some practical senses and it borders on a vague
14
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sense of culture. The discourse of difference plays more to ideas of ethnic superiority
than any specific understanding of what constituted the differences between Chinese and
barbarian ‘ways.’ However, some thinkers started to argue concretely about the core of
Western culture and what they identified was individualism and “people’s rights.” This
was usually understood as fundamentally opposed to Confucian teachings on the
hierarchical Five Relationships which formed the backbone of Confucianism. It
threatened the integrity of the state and violated the traditional norms. Zhang Zhidong
argued,
Once the theory of people’s rights is adopted, foolish people will certainly
be delighted, rebels will strike, order will not be maintained, and great
disturbances will arise on all sides…. Recently those who have picked up
some Western theories have gone so far as to say that everybody has the
right to be his own master. This is even more absurd. This phrase is
derived from the foreign books of religion.17
The concerns of culture and state stability are intertwined, and we see the idea of foreign
religion taking a more central place in the controversy. Thus, religion, capitalism, and
science begin to combine to form a core of Western culture.
Those who approved of Western ideas also argued on the basis of these human
rights and individualism. For instance, Yan Fu stated, “[There] is no matter in which their
theories cannot be put into practice. The reason is that they take freedom as the essential
principle and democracy as its application.”18 But these values taken as fundamental to
Western culture were not Chinese. What would happen to Chinese culture if it adopted
too much of the West? After all, “Barbarian institutions are based on barbarian principles.
Different principles make for different customs, and different customs give rise to
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different institutions…. If the institutions are to be changed, are not the principles going
to be changed along with them?”19 At this point, notions of fundamental cultural
differences take shape and these understandings inform reform thought at the start of
Chinese nationalism.
Voices were finally appearing, those of leading Confucian reformers Kang
Youwei or Tan Sitong, for instance, who argued for changing the fundamental principles
as the only way to modern success. Tan argued for eliminating the hierarchies and
modeling all relationships on the principle of friendship, the fifth relationship, because of
its basis of mutuality and equality, because “no fundamental principles and systems can
be introduced if the Five Moral Relationships remain unchanged, let alone the Three
Bonds.”20 This contrasts sharply with the edict of the newly reforming court of the
Empress Dowager Cixi, when it issued the Reform Edict in 1901 saying, “the Three
Mainstays (Bonds)… and the Five Constant Virtues… remain forever fixed and
unchanging, just as the sun and the stars shine steadfastly upon the earth.”21 The rifts
were widening between the radical reformers and more conservative voices because the
core of Chinese culture was suddenly at fault for keeping people in the past. However,
the parameters of the debate were largely set. A traditional culture needed to be protected
or a new one formed that was rooted in some core values, and institutions relating to and
supporting the selected values had to be put into place.
While all were arguing that China had to make changes at the beginning of the
20th century in order to regain its standing in the world, most recognized that cultures
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had to remain distinct. Thus, Liang Qichao argued, “When a nation can stand up in the
world its citizens must have a unique character. From morality and laws to customs,
habits, literature, and the arts, these all possess a certain unique spirit.”22 Nationalism was
the foundation of the future for China, and it contained within it the understanding that a
national culture was necessary that stood distinct from other nations. But the cultural had
to “stand up” on the world stage and thus, one of the most important considerations for
whether a part of Chinese culture was viable or worth advocating was its functional
effects on the Chinese nation. Most discussion above related to the Confucian tradition
because this was the hegemonic structure behind all of governance and officialdom in
China prior to the Hundred Days Reform in 1898. However, the larger question was one
of authority in a modernizing nation. The creation of this national culture drew upon
theories of modernity emphasizing progress and rationality and this had deep
ramifications for all religious actors or people claiming any authority based upon Heaven
or divinity. Daoists and Buddhists, largely peripheral actors to state power, were also
affected dramatically due to these developing notions of Chinese modern national culture.
Chinese Nationalism and Cultural Identity in the Revolution and Republic
At the turn of the 20th century, we finally see the beginnings of a well formed
cultural discourse. At the same time there is the first introduction the terms ‘religion’ and
‘superstition’ by way of Japan, first used by the reformer Liang Qichao. These terms
aren’t connected by historical accident, as Asad and Mayfair Yang both remind us. Asad
argues that “the authoritative status of representations/discourses is dependent on the
appropriate production of other representations/discourses; the two are intrinsically and
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not just temporally connected.”23 The discourses of modern civilization and culture are
intrinsically linked to the division of religion and superstition, and through them to
notions of national identity, progress, modernity, and all the consequences of the political
distinction between the public and private. Thus Mayfair Yang says, “The Protestantinformed categories of ‘religion’ and ‘superstition’ produced a new definition of
‘civilization’ (wenming) modeled on Western science and progress, and distant from the
old Confucian notions of the cultured and cultivated sage.”24 While I tried to argue a
distinct difference between the terms civilization and culture above, and there certainly is
a difference, the reformers at this time were using the term culture tied intimately with
the notion of progress implicit in the term civilization.25
The importance of the notion of culture in the Chinese nationalist discourse
should be readily apparent. Following the overthrow of the Qing dynasty, the
foundational movement in which all the nationalists took part, be they Republicans or
Communists, was known as the New Culture movement. The debates, revolutions, and
wars that took place during this period were fought to decide whose notion of Chinese
culture would gain hegemony and determine the reconstruction of national institutions
and identity. With consistent failures to uphold sovereignty in the face of foreign powers,
reformers like Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen argued persuasively that the problem was
not technological or failure to uphold orthodoxy, but rather, “We Chinese lack the
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concept of the nation.”26 In their minds, traditional cultural values, such as the importance
of familial bonds and clan-based thinking, made China an insular culture which could not
identify as citizens serving the interests of the state. Thus Sun says, “The Chinese people
have only family and clan solidarity; they do not have national spirit.”27 Loyalty to the
state or the national people needed to replace the old loyalties to clan, and this meant
finding a way to either change the meaning of traditional relationships or adopting a new
culture entirely. Because creating a modern national identity was influenced by
understandings of rational religion separated from superstitious belief, due to the close
link between local authority and clan ties with popular religious cults, these affected the
way Chinese thinkers thought about their own religious traditions.
The writings of Sun Yat-sen demonstrate a shift in the discourse towards a
reliance upon the notion of culture. The effort to establish a national culture took the
main-stage and values were seen explicitly in terms of overarching cultural systems. The
term culture was not alone in this discussion, as many used the idea of culture and
matched it with nationalist identity construction. Liu notes the earlier term, also taken
from Meiji translations of Western ideas, of ‘national character’ (guomin xing 国民性)
which played centrally into these debates alongside ‘national essence’ (guocui 国粹),
‘nation’ (minzu 民族), and ‘national learning’ (guoxue 国学), all of which were trying to
define, with varying degrees of tradition and innovation, the nature and character of the
Chinese people in opposition to a foreign other.28 From the edict issued in July 1898
during the Hundred Days Reform, all local shrines not in the record of the official rites
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(sidian) were to be converted into schools. The question of how to modernize these
schools was an open one, and many argued that they should maintain the educational
foundation in traditional Confucian values. Thus, when Zhang Zhidong, Zhang Baixi, and
Rongqing were appointed to formulate the ‘Guiding Principles on School [Xuewu
gangyao]’ in 1903, they wanted to include Confucian teachings with the argument that,
“In foreign countries schools all have a curriculum concerning ‘religion.’ In China the
[Confucian] Classics are our Chinese religion.’”29 The relation of Confucianism to the
idea of religion became significant.
Sun, in his more conservative mode, calls the people not to give up traditional
values in favor of the foreign culture. “[We] must recover and restore our characteristic,
traditional morality…. First comes loyalty and filial piety, then humanity and love,
faithfulness and duty, harmony and peace. Of these traditional virtues, the Chinese people
still speak, but now, under foreign oppression, we have been invaded by a new culture.”30
Much like the problems we saw before of a Western culture obsessed with the individual
and profit, Sun attempted to revitalize the notion of duty into a national discourse of
citizenship where individuals were part of and also loyal to ‘the people’ of China.
Chinese culture was valuable in its potential to encourage loyalty as citizens, with the
national interest replacing kings and princes. The push for a national identity that would
supersede local or familial ties meant that Sun felt one needed to keep traditional forms
of culture but reinterpret them such that loyalties served a new concept of ‘the people’ or
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a national citizenry instead of hierarchies linked to an imperial system, a shift discussed
above as central to the notion of culture itself.31
In 1935 a group of ten university professors wrote a “Declaration for Cultural
Construction on a Chinese Basis” for the magazine Cultural Construction. The primacy
of the cultural discourse at this time shows through in the existence of this magazine and
others advocating cultural construction, but what makes this essay interesting is its
attempt to cater to the uniqueness of Chinese culture while acknowledging that progress
would not come from rejuvenating the past. As they said, “ancient China is already
history, and history cannot and need not be repeated.”32 This new culture required
something distinctly Chinese because “China, which is neither England nor the United
States, should have its own distinctive characteristics…. We demand a cultural
construction on the Chinese basis.”33 This striving for unique Chinese solutions to the
problems of modern national construction was seen among many, including Sun Yat-sen
in his Three People’s Principles and natively sourced five branches of government.34 If
one accepts Plamenatz’s division of nationalisms into two types, those which are
culturally equipped but materially weak in comparison, and those which are culturally ill-
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equipped for modernity and must transform more dramatically, these thinkers fall more
towards the former, though strafing this division.35
The aspirational nature of this cultural discourse comes through clearly in their
essay. They are walking a difficult line, which most reform thinkers walked at this time,
between a desire for progress and a need to ‘recover’ a lost cultural identity and dignity.
They said of the proposed new culture,
Cultural construction on the Chinese basis is a creative endeavor, one that
is pushing ahead. Its objective is to enable China and the Chinese, who are
backward and have lost their unique qualities in the cultural sphere, not
only to keep pace with other countries and peoples but also to make
valuable contributions to a world culture.36
With this last sense of culture they argued in a way that recognized a global culture tied
to the civilizational discourse, one in which there were competing cultural traditions that
could leave their mark and advance other nations too.37
The hope of a measured reevaluation and reinvigoration of traditional values was
largely unsuccessful due to an even stronger desire to overturn old power structures,
though this effort to reinvigorate traditional Confucian values continues to resurface.38
Remember that the cultural values of Confucianism were tied to the Confucian state and
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these hierarchical structures defined all levels of society, from the emperor to the local
elites to the family. For this reason, even as Sun argued for a tempered maintenance of
traditional values he called for revolution and radical reform. In his three stages of
revolution the first was destruction and this included the destruction of “depraved
customs” and “the scourge of opium, superstitious beliefs, and geomancy,”39 amongst
many other aspects of the political and cultural system of China. The revolution would
mark the destruction of many cultural elements aside from institutional reforms. Why
Sun wanted to remove these “depraved customs” was hinted at above, but in the
following section we will examine this issue specifically as it impacts the various
religious traditions throughout the years of revolution.
Some revolutionaries, including many involved with the Communist Party, called
for even wider-ranging reforms. Members of the New Culture movement called for a
complete rejection of Confucian values which were “the ethics of a feudal age,”40 and
only served the interests of rulers and aristocrats. All systems of the New Culture would
need to serve the interests of the people. They would also need to motivate people to
transform their country because they needed a revolution. Put in fairly clear terms, “[If]
we do not personally take a large broom to sweep away the rotten customs of the
ancestors, then how can we hope to foster the ideal China?”41 Constructing culture and
progressing as a society towards modernity was a destructive and violent process, and
violence against religious values and institutions featured heavily. The issues of culture
and religion were intimately related, not only because both concepts entered China at
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roughly the same time and became important concepts in the discussion, but also
because, as seen before, social values and beliefs in the supernatural were intimately tied
to institutional authority, and because in the discussion of civilizations or cultures the
idea of religious reform based on the public-private distinction was foundational to the
discourse. United members of the Republican and Communist forces were the victors in
the fight for national construction, and although they disagreed on some aspects of how
to reorganize the state, they were largely in agreement on the role of religion in
nationalist reconstruction. It is to the understandings of religion and policies directed
towards religion that we now turn.
Religious Policies in the Chinese Nation
When constructing the new Chinese national cultural identity, the Nationalists of
the Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party) led first by Sun Yat-sen and then Chiang Kaishek, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) both chose to position religion as external
to Chinese politics and external to the official cultural identity. From intellectuals
attempting to sway the imperial authorities, these thinkers finally gained power in 1919
and their visions of Chinese national identity became the official view with the force of
law behind it. Viewing traditional culture and institutions as at fault for the failings of the
Chinese state, they sought to radically overhaul state policies and chief among the
components that had to be re-imagined for the modern state were religious traditions.
While the Nationalists and the Communists differed in the degree to which religion
should be eliminated, both created a space for religion outside of politics and modern
culture, emphasizing protection of belief rather than action.
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As the modern notion of culture entered the Chinese understanding, the term for
religion, zongjiao 宗教, came into use. This term contains two components, one tied to the
idea of a lineage, ancestors, or sect, generally having senses of a line of inheritance or
transmission, and one meaning a teaching or instruction. It was not a completely new
construction, having some precedent in classical Chinese, and had previously referred to
some forms of Buddhism. However, the term zongjiao was used within a new context and
thus took on new connotations and served different functions.42 Huang Zunxian,
Secretary of Legation in Japan from 1877 to 1882, used the translated term for religion,
zongjiao, in publication in 1890, and Liang Qichao popularized the term zongjiao while
in exile in Japan after the Hundred Days Reform of 1898.43
Prior to this term, what we might identify as religions today, namely Daoism,
Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Confucianism, and popular religion, were talked about as
“teachings” (jiao 教). The way these teachings functioned and the criteria by which they
were judged differed depending on the tradition and the context, but the term religion as
it functioned within the cultural imaginings of the early 20th century held all of these
traditions to enlightenment standards of rationality. Asad identifies the new
understanding of religion inherited from the Enlightenment as “anchored in personal
experience, expressible as belief-statements, dependent on private institutions, and
practiced in one’s spare time.”44 Whereas the state initially was inseparable from public
rituals, now religion was separate from politics, stripped of much of its public, communal
practice, and belonging instead to the private sphere of belief. Religion became
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“inessential to our common politics, economy, science, and morality.”45 Not only is
religion kept separate from politics, but whenever it enters politics it is considered “a
disguise for political power.”46 Thus, you get quotes from Mao Zedong saying, “Nor,
similarly, will our constitution and laws ever provide the slightest facility for those
elements who engage in counter-revolutionary activities under the cloak of religion.”47
Zongjiao was now a term packed with enlightenment conceptions separating the sacred
and the secular, the private and the public, and the rational from the irrational; it elicited
suspicion in secular national culture.
The Confucian representative to the World’s Parliament of Religion in 1893, Peng
Guangyu, stated this division and suspicion of religion well:
Owing to the radical differences in customs and manners between China
and the nations of the West, what is properly called ‘religion’ has never
been considered a desirable thing for people to know and for the
Government to sanction. The reason is that every attempt to propagate
religious doctrines in China has already given rise to the spreading of
falsehoods and errors, and finally to the [people’s] resistance to legitimate
authority and the onset of dire calamities in the country.48
Religion was not only suspicious but had in actuality led to resistance and rebellion.
Religions posited authority that was not legitimate, whereas only political leaders could
make legitimate claims to authority. One of the main grounds for criticizing religion was
as an effort to ensure socio-political stability and thus, should religion exist in modern
society it ought to aid society and the state in some way. This type of thinking meant that
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certain actions and beliefs could be censured by the state if they failed to further the
secular goal of stability.
To make it further clear that this term was not the same as those used before,
unacceptable religion also had a new term: superstition (mixin 迷信). Prior terms included
heterodoxy (yiduan 异端) or evil cults (xiejiao 邪教), and though both remained in use,
superstition was the crucial term for conceptualizing religion within the modern.49 The
new term superstition was composed of characters meaning to be confused (mi 迷) and to
believe or have confidence in (xin 信). Thus, its meaning was to have a confused belief,
one without proper understanding, and this means that religions must have proper
grounds for their beliefs. This term appealed to religious practitioners and revolutionaries
alike due to its emphasis on the rational aspects of religion and ties to ideas of historical
progress. Asad defines superstition as “practices that had survived beyond their proper
time,”50 and Inglis calls it “any form of social practice… that seems to have no basis of
authority other than that of tradition.”51 Having superstitious beliefs could harm society
by leading to rebellion, but more often it was tied to reliance upon foolish methods to
seek gain or political authority. While traditional cultural norms had legitimized local and
Imperial authorities through various ritual practices, now authority had to be based upon
notions of rationality and progress. Thus, the reformer Hu Shi could praise Western
religion for having “overthrown the religion of superstitions and established a rational
belief,… destroyed divine power and established a humanistic religion…”52 By
positioning the new state against the irrational and unscientific, the new leaders could
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claim a greater legitimacy through this opposition.53 Politics based on rational policies
had supremacy over religious understandings.
If there were any difference between the Republican government and the
Communist government in their attitudes towards religion, it was that the Communists
largely rejected a distinction between good and bad religion. An orthodox understanding
held that, “Religion is also superstition. It is a type of superstition with deep roots and the
support of material powers.”54 Despite this difference, with regard to the majority of
policy issues they were aligned and even used the same language of modernization to
advocate their positions. The Communists talked of religion in a way that highlighted the
wealth disparity of the religions that had propped up ‘feudalism,’ but this was in essence
the same argument as the nationalists. Likewise, both groups argued against imperialists
having any role in religious organizations. Both groups primarily sought to centralize
authority through elimination of other sources of local or foreign authority outside of
their regime, and in this way they advanced national well-being. Eng and Lin argue that,
“The communist revolution destroyed the multi-centric power bases of the local elite and
made the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the single source of legitimacy,”55 and this
relied upon efforts to eliminate the prior superstitious authority structures.
Material concerns of poverty and production featured prominently in the
discussions around strengthening and it was the functional argument against religion as
weakening the state and populace that gained prominence amongst leading voices in both
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parties. Mao Zedong made many public criticisms of religion utilizing this same logic of
superstitious, illegitimate practices, and often united the arguments against superstition
with the state goals of progress. Writing against clan authority and popular religion in
1927, he said, “You have worshiped them for centuries, and they have not overthrown a
single one of the local tyrants or evil gentry for you! Now you want to have your rent
reduced. Let me ask how will you go about it? Will you believe in the gods or in the
peasant associations?”56 Showing consistent opposition between the secular and the
religious in accomplishing goals of progress, Mao said in 1965, “Gods are all right for the
rich; the poor have the Eighth Route Army.”57 As cultural critics looked at the system of
religion in China they saw decentralizing forces, ones built upon irrational beliefs and
practices of petitioning and propping up gods. For the Communists this meant that feudal
exploitation built into the system of religion was holding back progress. For both
Communists and Nationalists, religious cults were cultural forms of the past, and those
who were part of the system of temples and local cults were quickly becoming an
indigenous ‘other’ in the minds of New Culture thinkers, ones who were ‘other’ in the
sense of belonging to another feudal time.
Having removed religion from the realm of political legitimacy or authority,
constitutional understandings of religion crafted by both the Nationalists and the
Communists protected religion insofar as it remained within the private realm of belief.
From the earliest constitutions up to the present constitution of China, official
understandings of the freedom of religion were determined by the language of belief
rather than practice. An amendment to article 11 of the constitution of the Republic of
56
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China in 1913 states, “Citizens of the Republic of China have the freedom to worship
Confucius or to profess any religion; this freedom shall not be restricted except in
accordance with law.58 Xinjiao ziyou (信教自由, the freedom to believe a teaching) was
adopted rather than xinyang zongjiao ziyou (信仰宗教自由, the freedom of religious faith)
so that Confucianism was encompassed while not being a religion,59 though it was a
highly contested decision due to the contentious debate around upholding the Confucian
state cult. The constitutional framers were attempting to ensure the freedom of all creeds
but to limit any practices based on a religion that might violate other state laws. The
explicit preference for secular law in the freedom of religion clause was only left out of
the June 1, 1931 Provisional Constitution after heated debate, and in the next draft from
1936 the restriction returned. Secular law always took precedent and the only thing that
was protected was privately held belief.60 This matches Mao Zedong’s thought when he
made official Communist Policy, “If religion does not interfere with the People’s
Republic, the People’s Republic will not interfere with it.”61
The most vocal and significant advocates of religious freedom were the
Buddhists, motivated by continued concerns over the survival of their tradition and
legitimate fears of the state acquisition of temple property. Buddhist and Daoists, due to
their association with various “superstitious practices,” had to adapt their traditions to the
statements of Xue Dubi, Minister of Interior in 1928, who in a Central Daily News
(Zhongyang ribao 中央日报) distinguished between “‘ignorant’ superstition in ‘the God of
Wealth, City Gods, earth gods and worshiping wood, stone, foxes, and snakes,’ which
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should be destroyed, and the country’s ancient sages and ‘formal religions,’ protected
under the party platform’s freedoms.”62 Xue called for Buddhists to “abandon such
practices and instead emulate Christians…. [and] reform their religion so that it would
promote world progress, prevent war in East Asia, and help China assert its sovereign
rights.”63 These views from the state spokesman illustrate how religions should be
rational and sublimate their motives to secular goals tied to progress. For both the
Buddhist and Daoist traditions these divisions fundamentally affected their activities as
they interacted with the local communities that supported them. Many of the practices
that were traditionally central to the religions of the common people were explicitly
denounced and made illegal due to their failure to promote modern goals of
secularization and rationalism.
Taixu, leading Buddhist reformer during the revolutionary years, disputed
proposals that involved confiscation of temple property in his magazine “Sound of the
Tide” (haichao yin 海潮音), arguing that monastic property was jointly owned by the
clergy, and “placed Buddhists and their property firmly inside an everyday social and
civic framework.”64 But because religious institutions still carried with them the danger
of sectarianism and revolt, and because they fit so awkwardly within modernity, the 1929
Rules for Temple Management forced “temples and clergy to a political litmus test
[among other challenges]…[and] they enabled local governments and ‘public groups’
(gonggong tuanti 公共团体) to take charge of temple property in the event that test was
failed.”65 In direct response to these challenges, the three main organizations for
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Buddhism met in April in Shanghai and formed the Buddhist Association of China. The
Third Party Congress created new categories under government jurisdiction in their
continued struggle to deal with religious organizations. They added ‘social organizations’
(shehui tuanti 社会团体) and a sub-group called ‘cultural groups’ (wenhua tuanti 文化团体)
to accommodate temples.66 It seems that religion was saved by culture, but only
tentatively.
The best strategy for keeping on the right side of the law was to shape religious
organizations along the established lines of the government. Groups could at any time be
deemed illegal and have their practices restricted for the protection of the public and this
meant that the safest way to remain firmly legal was to register all of your institutions and
your clergy through sanctioned national organizations.67 While all schools and
organizations were being molded to fit the goals of nationalism, religious groups were
forced to fall in line in order to survive. Whatever other teachings they might have, they
needed to also incorporate the goals of the party (‘partify’ danghua 党化).68 A 1930
propaganda pamphlet on cultural organizations showed that the government needed
support from local clergy to spread their message and that they were also carrying out a
long-term strategy to convert the customs and beliefs of the people. It read, in part,
Although the responsibility of improving [customs] originally depended
on the efforts of government, it is better to rely on the active moral
leadership and discipline of cultural organizations. Since all kinds of
unfortunate practices have long ago settled deep in the people’s hearts and
minds, changing popular habits cannot be achieved simply with one
government order. It is better to rely on the cooperation and the example
of cultural groups to subtly change [these habits] and rectify them one by
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one. Then they will begin to disappear, and we can realize a new
revolutionary society under the Three Principles of the People.69
National religious organizations helped the government spread its new national culture
and created a means of unifying the messages coming out of these groups. But not all
groups could gain national recognition and protection, even if they were supportive of the
government. Groups that were part of traditional culture but did not benefit society were
ineligible for official recognition. For this reason, an organization for Mediums and
Prognosticators was denied official status, with the government arguing they should no
longer exist.70 Further, the government could eliminate practices while protecting spaces,
redefining the temple spaces as having cultural and historical value but no value as spaces
for rituals to Confucius or other popular religious deities.71
This language of “changing the people’s hearts and minds” was not unique to the
Nationalists. In Mao’s essay “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the
People” during the Hundred Flowers Campaign in 1957 he claimed that,
We cannot abolish religion by administrative orders; nor can we force
people not to believe in it… In settling matters of an ideological nature or
controversial issues among the people, we can only use democratic
methods, methods of discussion, of criticism, of persuasion and education,
not coercive, high-handed methods.72
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Thus, be they Nationalists or Communists, they both advocated utilizing religious and
secular organizations to convince the people of the new culture they were espousing in
opposition to previous religious forms.
The Communist regime was more effective in creating external thought reform
methods to promote their new cultural hegemony. They constantly enforced their
understandings through socially and politically coercive means. One report from 1950
Nanjing claimed that things were normal but, “The noticeable differences were frequent
interruptions of work for special lectures, parades, and other political functions usually
announced at the last moment, thus involving constant changes in other plans and
programs.”73 The soviets called these special groups and meetings “transmission belt
organizations” and they were an effective means of eliminating other forms of truth from
the public sphere.74 An example of an attempt to do this was to put up signs which
denounced the old cultural forms around town and within the institutions themselves. For
instance, “Most churches had much simpler signs, such as ‘discard the old!’ or ‘This is
forbidden!’ Crosses and other religious symbols were removed from tombstones in a
cemetery for foreigners in Peking.”75
The privatization of religious belief was so absolute at times during the early
Communist government that a report from visiting Muslims from Pakistan in 1956 left
them with the impression that there was no freedom of religion, speech, assembly, or the
press. The library was filled with primarily pro-Communist literature and “all radio sets
were tuned only to Peking. He tried to listen to other stations but every time his radio set
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was connected to Radio Peking.”76 This form of social pressure and officially permitted
culture was only further strengthened during the Cultural Revolution when, in at least
some locations, loudspeakers controlled by the government and tuned to approved
stations were installed in every house and around town with no way of turning them off
or changing the content.77
Some might argue that political ideology or religious practices are the specific
social categories that people were arguing against and that the term culture was not really
that important. Contrary to this notion, I argue that the separate spheres of political and
religious authority came with and were intimately connected to the notions of culture.
Furthermore, in the actual rhetoric of the day, culture was a central term that people used
to conceptualize and control religion. As an obvious example of this line of thinking
dictating state policy during the Communist period, at the beginning of the Cultural
Revolution in 1966, the main campaign was against the “Four Olds” that had to be
eliminated: old culture, old thinking, old habits, old customs. Various aspects of religion
were connected to all of these four olds. As the Communists saw it “the budding
culture…of primitive society was restrained by religion,”78 and the budding culture of
modern China needed to lose this restraint. The ideology was not different from those
that came before, but the implementation of policy and regulation changed. All members
of the state, particularly the youth, were encouraged to eliminate these aspects of the old
China and implement the Marxist representations of the modern. Religion had once been
regulated for safe-keeping and eventual elimination, but following the same logic, should
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anyone hasten the destruction of religion or old culture, it was no great loss. Thus, in this
period all of the official language about freedom of religion often took a backseat to the
larger goal of eradicating religion as part of the old culture that needed to be replaced.
While higher levels of government could always blame localized authorities for their
‘misunderstanding’ of the religious policies, for the arguments discussed in this paper, it
is important to note that the way one talked about and constructed the ideal national
culture had real effects on the people practicing religion and the people who were
supposed to enforce policy towards these people’s activities. How much religion could
exist in the public sphere? What counted as legitimate religion? What benefit did religion
have for Chinese society? These questions formed the basis for all negotiations of
religion with Chinese national culture.
As shown in this section, the national forms of religion were characterized by
incorporation into a larger secular ideology and could legitimize themselves through their
positive social roles. Having just seen some of the more staunchly articulated views of
religion as external to a modern national identity, in the next section I turn to an
examination of the ways the Chinese Taoist Association, arbiters of a tradition intimately
connected with popular religion and superstitious practices, sought to legitimize its
religious organization and how the arguments for a sanctioned form of traditional culture
shape the Daoist tradition today and are utilized to maintain Daoism’s continued cultural
relevance.
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CHAPTER 3: CULTURAL REVIVAL AND THE CHINESE TAOIST ASSOCIATION
Introduction
For much of China’s modern history, the discourse of culture was not a protective
discourse for religious traditions. While different religious individuals attempted to use it
to legitimize their tradition, by privileging the civilizational notion of progress and
modernity the majority of Chinese political leaders identified Chinese traditions as part of
an old culture that ought to be left behind or violently eradicated. The fundamentals of
this belief in historical progress remain central to the official theoretical understandings
of culture, however since the Reform and Opening period following Mao’s death, a
separate notion of culture has taken precedent.
After attempting to eradicate superstition and regulate religion under early
Communist rule,1 the 1980s saw the use of culture as a means to reinvigorate these
practices.2 This study investigates the success and consequences of this terminological
game. This idea of culture is now tied to heritage and imbued with value as either local
tradition or tourist attraction. While still theoretically and rhetorically tied to the past, the
regulations and priorities of the government have shifted and created a “zone of
indifference” for traditional religious practices to remain in the present. Because this
narrative has particularly affected Daoism and local expressions of this tradition, below I
will examine the ways that this cultural discourse has allowed for the continued existence
and even revitalization of the Daoist tradition since the end of the Cultural Revolution.
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My arguments rely upon recent fieldwork by ethnographers in China and an
examination of the publications of the Chinese Taoist Association. By examining these
sources, I will argue that the use of the cultural discourse to create a space for Daoist
practice privileges the official government views of culture and the Daoist tradition in a
way that de-emphasizes the connection between popular religion and Daoism, encourages
deconstruction of the tradition into safe pieces such as Taiji or calligraphy, and sterilizes
the tradition into philosophical platitudes for the foreign audience. While this fits into
larger historical trends, the modernist cultural discourse has changed the emphasis from
religious or spiritual legitimacy to a concern over the appropriateness of traditional
Daoist practices within modernity. To make this argument I will highlight the issues that
arise from the continued reliance upon firm distinctions between religious traditions
emphasized by Western notions of religion, and the continued rhetorical othering of
superstitious discourses. Cultural revitalization does not eliminate these issues, it only
puts them off for another day and leaves practitioners in a legal gray area. Further, the
discussion of cultural heritage allows local superstition to resume but keeps it invisible
from outside view, thus limiting its legitimacy and privileging only those forms that can
safely be removed from religious practice or can be argued to be rational practices.
Creation of a Cultural Safe Space for Religion
As seen in the preceding sections, the foremost question of how to reshape
Chinese culture and make it viable was the issue of modernization, particularly as viewed
through the lens of strengthening the nation. While Mao crafted his Cultural Revolution
around the eradication of the “Four Olds,” old customs, old culture, old habits, and old
ideas, today most recognize a revival of many aspects of these traditional cultural forms.
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In addition, by attempting to identify some characteristic Chinese culture that is distinct
from all other modern cultures, the traditional cultural forms are a mark of pride in the
international community. On both a local and an international scale, many Chinese are
attempting to utilize the cultural discourse and imagine Daoism or popular religious
traditions at the center of this identity in an effort to claim legitimacy for their activities.
One of the frequently used official phrases to emphasize this use of culture in the
modernization effort was, “Culture building the stage and the economy doing the
performance” (文化搭台，经济唱戏).3 As this phrase indicates, cultural forms serve the
pragmatic goal of economic advancement. Through a new category of “intangible
cultural heritage” rooted in the system of heritage sites under UNESCO, there is a new
way to imagine practices that are not modern inside a modern space. Their main value is
in creating a vibrant tourist infrastructure that can attract foreign interest, and as the
Chinese tourism industry expands it continues to use religious traditions to make China
distinct and appealing to a foreign gaze. But this does not eliminate the importance of
modernization, it simply creates a new way to partition and utilize religious traditions that
could theoretically be nonthreatening to an image of a modern China.
By advocating both traditional culture and modernization, the official spaces for
religious activities and traditional culture were re-imagined in post-Mao China, but on a
theoretical basis the views were not reversed. The official pronouncements on religion
still followed a Marxist or a modernist perspective that religion was a phenomenon of the
past that needed to be shaken off. Marsh does find some evidence of understandings
changing, with Lu Daji arguing for regulation rather than abolition of religion and Zhang
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Ji’an, writing in World Religion Research (世界宗教研究), describing religion as an
anesthetic rather than an opiate.4 However, it is best to see these views as coinciding with
views prior to the Cultural Revolution and fitting particularly well within early
Nationalist understandings. Qu Hong quotes President Jiang Zemin at a National United
Front Work Conference in December 2000 saying, “Religion has a long history and will
continue to exist for a long time under socialism. The ultimate withering away of
religion, to be certain, will be a long historical process, perhaps longer than that of the
class and state.”5 In continuity with this understanding, in 2008 he advocated working
with religious personnel to “build an all-round moderately prosperous society while
quickening the pace toward the modernization of socialism.’”6 While the leaders still use
the language of struggle against religion, more often they stress the goals of prosperity or
a harmonious society. Indeed, this language of harmony is one avenue through which
they have sought to position the teachings of religions as in line with current socialist
understandings and goals. While religion in the revolutionary period was viewed as
weakening the state and incommensurable with the modern culture, now the government
allowed some forms of religion in an effort to counteract moral decline and expand the
economic development of the Chinese nation.
After Deng Xiaoping came to power following the death of Mao and the political
trials of the Gang of Four, he stressed less ideological purity and more economic
pragmatism. This has created an expansion of activity in the religious sphere. While
official ideology has not changed from previous periods, the legal enforcement and
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classification of certain religious activities has changed. For instance, the Beijing
Religious Regulation of 2002 no longer banned superstitious activities, classifying these
activities “such as fortune telling, palmistry, face-reading, or astrology… under the
favorable category of cultural heritage.”7 Cultural activities, though not given official
approval, are now in what Potter has termed a “zone of indifference.”8 While it is
important to note the shift in the official rhetoric under certain circumstances, this does
not mean that the activities belonging to a Chinese cultural heritage should be kept alive
or that they have moved in the popular imagination out of the realm of superstition.
Fenggang Yang proposes looking at religion in post-Mao China as an economy
with different markets that provide people with options for religious consumption. Each
of these provides different opportunities to participants but is also subject to its own
regulatory and legal restrictions. He divides this religious market into three parts: red,
black, and gray markets of religion. In his words,
A red market of religion consists of all legal (officially permitted)
religious organizations, believers, and religious activities…. A black
market of religion consists of all illegal (officially banned) religious
organizations, believers, and religious activities…. A gray market of
religion consists of all religious and spiritual organizations, practitioners,
and activities with ambiguous legal status.9
The legal religious space is subject to regulation but within limits, while the other two
categories are more likely to be subject to harsh treatment and classified as illegal
activities. This division illustrates well how a religion could be partially legal as a result
of its varied content. The discourse of superstition and religion resulted in some practices
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becoming illegal (e.g. divination, fengshui, etc.) while other actions remained protected
under freedom of religious belief. The re-imagining and re-invigoration of the cultural
discourse widened the space for these gray practices while the Chinese state authorities
were not officially sanctioning or advocating any religious or superstitious outlooks.
Some of the gray market groups that Yang highlights include house-type religious
services, private religious practices, proselytizing, and groups sponsored by the
government to promote foreign investment (e.g. Mazu and Tianhou deities).10 These
groups do not share a particular form of belief, but rather a form of practice that stands
outside of the organized religious groups and spaces that the government has united with
and supported. The practices within one’s home are difficult to regulate and
proselytizing, while legally restricted to official religious spaces, is often difficult to
control or identify in a public space. The groups used for foreign investment, most
important to this thesis, remain in a gray area and the legitimacy of these activities
depends on the packaging of the messages and the types of activities promoted. Culture is
a safe category and results in an emphasis on historical roots and historical value, but to
the extent these activities reflect a religious nature they must reflect only those religious
ideas and actions that fit the proper modern space.
We should remember that, while regulations come from the higher levels of
government, the motivations are often quite local and grassroots. Villagers during the
early 1980s responded to the environment of relaxing of cultural restrictions and engaged
in temple reconstruction, seeking both religious practice that had been prohibited and also
foreign investment in other temples and temple activities.11 In efforts to gain foreign
10
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investment in local communities, these temples were stressed as reflecting a historical
root that overseas Chinese could tap into, with historical relics “restored as reminders of
the cultural roots of overseas Chinese with local origin.”12 There is even evidence that
villages with restored and revitalized temples had “a higher probability of paved roads
and paths, a higher percentage of classrooms usable in rain, and a higher probability of
running water…”13 It appears that the goal of economic development was in many
instances met, but the relation of this goal to the actually cultural activities used to
accomplish this goal is less clear. We will examine this local temple activity first as it
relates to the Daoist tradition.
Local Religious Revival
The new freedom offered by the safe space of cultural heritage meant a quick and
enthusiastic resurgence of religious practices and temple renovation in local
communities. For an indication of how dramatic this revival was, Yanfei Sun claims that
in the region she studied, as of 2009, 660 temples had been restored or built and “of all of
the villages I visited, none has left its communal temple unrestored.”14 Kenneth Dean
says that, “the first thing that people who had money did was not to buy televisions and
refrigerators but to rebuild temples to their local cult god that had been destroyed during
the Cultural Revolution.”15 While this chapter looks at the way Daoism functions in the
new cultural discourse of post-Mao China, these were not specifically Daoist or Buddhist
practices. Chinese religion operates within a wider understanding of gods and religious
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beliefs that is common across most forms of Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism in
China. Most of these religious practices get identified under the catch-all term “popular
religion” and their practices are currently identified as “superstition.” However, the
Daoist tradition, particularly the Zhengyi (Orthodox Unity) sect of Daoism, is the most
difficult of the traditions to partition off from popular religion due to its focus on local
ritual. This is an important distinction because, even as the five official religions in China
have gained more protection since the 1982 constitution, “popular religion remains a
separate, leftover category, often equated with ‘feudal superstition.’”16 So for government
officials the distinction is quite important, and due to the remaining insecurity of
practicing popular religion, it is important to religious leaders of the official religions to
maintain a distinct identity.
One key way to distinguish between popular religion and Daoism is to look at the
authority in local temples and religious festivals. In popular religion, religious sites and
events are almost entirely run by local residents, with the decision-making and authority
resting almost always in the local secular leaders.17 This shows one reason that
resurgence of popular religion props up local authority and has been seen as a threat to
the centralization of authority since the early nationalists tried to re-imagine Chinese
cultural institutions. Eliminating these superstitious practices was tied to a notion of
modernizing the culture of the Chinese nation, but it was also partially an effort to limit
this diffuse authority. With the formal religious traditions agreeing to form national
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organizations they are more appealing to the national government because they are easier
to regulate and subordinate to centralized authority.
The location of authority is perhaps the best way to distinguish these traditions,
because if it were just about the contents of their underlying beliefs, many scholars see it
more fruitful to avoid drawing divisions between high and popular religious traditions in
China.18 In most forms, the traditional religions in China all support similar ideas within
the local community. Daoism and popular religion share much the same beliefs in the
areas of cosmology, divinity, and ghosts, which helps them maintain their legitimacy
within the local communities to “function as a mediator between humans and spirits, as a
communicator who is said to be able ‘to reach the gods and the sages,’”19 in various
festivals centered around the seasons, rites of passage, or “destiny-correcting rituals.”
While there were many different forms of ritual specialists in China during the
Republican period, including ‘house-dwelling’ Daoist priests (huoju 火居) of the Zhengyi
sect, Confucian ritualists (lisheng 礼生), scholarly elites (shidaifu 士大夫) and spirit
mediums, who all provided different forms of ritual specialization selling “efficacy and
authority,”20 with time many of these were pushed out of the market as a result of anticlericalism. Without distinguishing the contents of these beliefs dramatically, Daoists
attempt to distinguish themselves from popular religions by adding a supralocal canon, a
uniform ritual structure, and an organized national institution, all things which popular
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religion lacks. However, for many Daoist priests they maintain their underlying shamanic
and ecstatic religious practices.21 Thus, while Daoist ritual masters (fashi 法师) or Daoist
priests (daoshi 道士) often perform the same role as local shamans, their lineage claims,
training, and subordination to a national organization give them added legitimacy in the
community and in the eyes of the government.22
Distinguishing along these lines of authority or institutional structure does not
mean that they are removed from the popular religious practices. Kenneth Dean in his
ethnographic studies of popular religion in Southeast China found that Buddhist or Daoist
clergy were required for ritual activity, with Daoist ritual forming “the main structuring
element in the vast liturgical framework that supports the festival of the local god.”23
These festivals need Daoist priests in order to conduct a jiao ritual of purification or to
invite the Emperor of Heaven and his troops to earth, which Confucian or Buddhist ritual
specialists could not provide.24 Thus, while the higher institutionalization of their
practices, based in texts, training, and ordination processes, gives them more authority in
religious events, they are not removed from communal rituals. This means that they
engage in actions that many in local and national government view as superstitious.
Further, the largest annual ritual conducted by Daoists, the jiao, is primarily used to
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“subdue wandering ghosts in the area,”25 and a belief in ghosts falls squarely within the
realm of superstition.
This lack of distinction on beliefs and participation in superstitious activities is
problematic since superstition is still illegal. While local authorities have more freedom
to determine the status of these cultural practices, many are still uneasy with the presence
of these activities. Foreign investment, community cohesion, and cultural tourism all act
to usurp concern over superstitious ideology in contemporary China, but issues do still
arise. For instance, Kenneth Dean did fieldwork in Fujian and other parts of Southeast
China during the 1990s and witnessed conflict between different villages as well as with
the authorities. He provides an account of officials attempting to combat “superstitious
practices” and arresting village participants, Daoists, and Buddhists during a public
ritual.26 He quotes a teenage villager yelling at the police that “this was their procession
and that, even if Deng Xiaoping told them to stop, they wouldn’t.”27 Mayfair Yang also
reported that local leaders asked her how to define religion and superstition to defend
against government accusations.28
Most of what unites Daoism so closely with popular religion are the practices and
structures of Zhengyi Daoism in Southeast China. While Quanzhen Daoism has stressed
its cloistered and monastic nature as a mark of purity and pride, the Zhengyi tradition has
non-monastic monks who marry and have children and are thus more closely involved in
these newly revitalized popular religious practices. Lee sees this as a benefit because it
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“allows it to forge a very close union of Daoist myth, ritual, and worldview with the
religious aspects of local community life, such as community temple cults, ancestor
worship, and seasonal festivals.”29 On the other hand, the popular religious forms lack
firm legal legitimacy, falling instead within what Fenggang Yang terms the gray market
of religion.
The best strategy to gain legal legitimacy is to register with the national religious
organizations, be they Buddhist or Daoist. However, this is not always appealing to local
temple leaders. In order to register, these groups are required to have “a suitable building,
regular meetings, proper organization, professional leadership, governing rules, regular
income, and payment of a registration fee.”30 Oftentimes these were simply burdensome,
especially since the government was mostly turning a blind eye to temple groups. Sun
notes that the membership dues to the Buddhist Association of 5,000 yuan to register and
500 yuan annually were too high to appeal to these leaders. These high costs and the
extortion of other funds during the year for various charitable activities has meant that
“some registered temples have suffered a decline in wealth… [and] at least three of these
temples had not paid fees to renew their membership for more than two years and thus
have automatically given up their registered status.”31 Dean confirms the limited desire to
register temples with the Chinese Taoist Association because locals saw it as an
interfering regulatory body.32
The decision to remain outside of these organizations, while pragmatic at this
time, leaves the temples outside of the defined legal space for religious practice and
29
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means that the national government chooses simply not to acknowledge them. Popular
religious practices do indeed have a safe space at present within China and it is
attributable to the ability to claim legitimacy as part of traditional culture or intangible
cultural heritage, but the limits of this form of legitimacy keep their visibility local. The
nature of this cultural discourse means that most of what they actually do on a local level
limits their viability on a national or global scale. At best they get recognized as heritage
sites but their activities will remain hidden as superstitious and backward activities. To
gain wider legitimacy as cultural components, they must participate more fully in the
discourse of modernity by adapting their practices or institutionalizing their structures.
Daoists in the Modern and Reform Periods
Acknowledging that the revitalization of popular religion and local communal
rituals was a result of the use of the cultural discourse to create a safe space for these
practices, and further that it had wider appeal to diasporic Chinese living overseas, the
identification as cultural practices was not enough to make these events globally
appealing in the eyes of national officials. In order to see how people could effectively
position religion and Daoism in particular within a globally visible version of Chinese
culture, we need to look at the creation of modern Daoism since the Reform era. Daoists
in the modern period have largely been motivated by the impulse to distinguish
themselves more effectively from local ritual traditions and to identify their position
within Chinese culture as one tied to sanitized philosophical ideals, ethical norms, and
high culture products. Aspects of the Daoist tradition that do not fit these standards were
pushed out of the official cultural identity of China and disadvantaged by higher
institutional structures.
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During the years of searching for a national essence (guocui 国粹) from roughly
1910 to 1930, the inter-related traditions of Confucianism and Daoism were often
considered as viable options for this distinctly Chinese essence. In the renewed cultural
discourse of post-Mao China, these claims are gaining importance. In fact, looking at the
two books produced in cooperation with the CTA, both quote the famous vernacular
novelist Lu Xun from the New Culture and National Essence periods saying just that:
Daoism is the core of Chinese culture. These publications utilize the same unattributed
quotation, saying,
Taoist culture has long permeated the everyday life of ordinary Chinese
people since it exerted great influences on social customs in ancient China
and on the shaping of national consciousness. The venerated Lu Xun, the
great Chinese writer, once said, ‘China is rooted in Taoism.’ Taoism has
played an important role in the making of traditional Chinese culture. To
know it is to possess a key to a better understanding of traditional Chinese
culture.33
By positioning Daoism within the Chinese historical identity and claiming its
contemporary relevance to Chinese thought, the CTA attempts to argue Daoism’s
indispensability to China and thus the necessity of its preservation.
One interesting aspect of this use of Lu Xun to legitimize their tradition is that Lu
Xun likely meant this quote, if he truly ever said it, in a negative, rather than a positive
sense. As a leader in the radical reform movement, he was one of many who did not view
traditional culture in a positive light. He was very interested in finding a national essence
of the Chinese to solve for their weakness, giving up medicine in order to use literature to
change the nature of the Chinese people. Lydia Liu notes that scholars are in
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disagreement on whether Lu Xun was identifying a positive or negative essence, with
some thinking he meant it negatively referring to the failures and struggles against
imperialism and feudalism, and others that he meant it positively about ideas, moods,
social norms and history. However, all agree that the issue of identifying this Chinese
cultural essence was very important to him.34 Lu Xun wrote in the preface to the Russian
edition of one novel (among other similar quotes): “I tried my best to paint the soul of our
countrymen in modern times…”35 Noting Lu Xun’s place as a critic of traditional
Confucian ethics and centrally concerned on strengthening the Chinese people, I believe
that he did not mean the quote regarding Daoism in a positive light and yet in its present
use the Daoists in the CTA use it positively. This indicates a shift in perceptions from the
days of the New Culture and National Essence movements.
During the effort to find a National Essence, there was a resurgence in the study
of the pre-Qin philosophers in an effort to find elements of indigenous thought that had
evidence of science or could serve to inject Chineseness into the modern version of
China. In keeping with this desire to search Chinese traditions for value in modern China,
some Confucian scholars started examining the Daoist Canon for truths, doing historical
exegesis, but also searching for the same principled origins as they would from
Confucian texts.36 Liu Shipei read the whole canon in 1910 at Peking University and Hu
Shi published a historical study of Daoism, as did other scholars.37 The general goal was
to find modern value from pre-modern sources that had indigenous origins. What this
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amounted to is occasional derision of the tradition, but to the extent that it had value, the
Daoist tradition was said to contain highly valued cultural forms such as art and
medicine. The CTA still continually claims the true value of Daoism is in its “farreaching influences on China’s philosophy, literature, arts, medicine and science.”38
Daoism lays strongest claim to the foundational views in Chinese traditional philosophy
related to yin-yang, health practices, and much more. The CTA today goes further to
show that foreigners too see this truth, quoting the scholar of Daoism and Chinese
medicine Joseph Needham saying, “Many of the most attractive elements of the Chinese
character derive from Taoism. China without Taoism would be a tree of which some of
its deepest roots had perished.”39 Thus, people began deconstructing the tradition and
selecting aspects of which they approved in modernity and this remains one of the main
strategies for the Daoist tradition today.
Around this same time, some were searching for value in these traditions as active
and national religions. Kang Youwei advocated making Confucianism the national
religion but most rejected this effort to reform Confucianism into a religion, preferring to
keep it as a social philosophy. Instead, to the extent that China had a religion, many
argued for Daoism. For instance, Ye Dehui responded to Kang Youwei by arguing that
shamanism was developed “first by the legendary Yellow Emperor then by Laozi, into
Daoism, which became the origin of all other teachings in the world” and thus that
Daoism was the greatest teaching.40 These conclusions, having gone through various
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manifestations, remain the largely accepted view in the writings of the CTA and they
gladly recognize Daoism’s relationship with early religious forms in China.41
When the then abbot of the White Cloud Temple in Shanghai, Chen Mingbin, got
recognition for the Daojiao hui (National Taoist Association) in April 1912, he did so on
the grounds that Daoism could be the national religion of China. As Goossaert notes,
their manifesto argued that Daoism was the oldest indigenous religion in China and for
this reason should be the national religion. Not only should this religion be spread
worldwide, but it was also emphasized as “a political vision of Taoism as the moral and
spiritual arm of the Chinese state,” with Laozi providing “a blueprint for democracy and
freedom, nationalism and social progress” and emphasizing belief and a potential
“obligation for all members to congregate on Sundays to join in a Taoist service.”42 None
of the Christian-like reforms were put in place for Daoism, unlike those implemented by
Taixu for Buddhism, allegedly because they lacked a similar charismatic reformer, but
the impulse to create this kind of religion existed during this period.
Alongside this impulse to create a Daoist church with Christian institutional forms
was the more successful goal of turning Daoism into an object of study. In 1949, Master
Juzan, a monk close affiliate of the CCP “launched the slogan ‘academicization’
(xueshuhua) as a method for eliminating ‘superstitious’ elements from Buddhism so that
Buddhism may adapt itself better to the atheist ideology.”43 This goal was mirrored in the
defined objectives of the CTA from 1961 “to study the history of Daoism, publish
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journals, and set up training programs for our candidates.”44 While Daoism was not
recognized by the CCP until 1957 as the last national religious organization, since 1912
Daoists’ goals had shifted substantially and become more academic in nature. But this
was not a new movement in Daoism starting in 1961, just the coming to fruition of the
vision advanced by other noted reformers of Daoism starting in the New Culture period.
The most celebrated Daoist reformer was Chen Yingning, a highly educated
practitioner and student of Daoist alchemical practices. Also seeking to find native
solutions to China’s weakness, Chen sought the solution in strengthening the Chinese
nation by strengthening Chinese bodies. Many thinkers at the time were taken by
Darwinist theories and this fostered an increased interest in physical health. Interestingly,
Mao Zedong’s earliest magazine article was advocating a course of national fitness, and
arguments against foot binding and opium use in the writings of Yan Fu (1854-1921)
were influenced by well-known reformers such as Liang Qichao, Cai E, and Mao
Zedong.45 Chen Yingning and others similarly advocated Daoist ‘nourishing life’
techniques. In this way, “the Chinese medical tradition was reformulated as part of
China’s ‘national essence,’ a priceless gem that, along with calligraphy and art, should be
proudly preserved by any self-respecting countryman.”46
Chen and others started the promotion of these body cultivation techniques
through two widely read magazines, The Biweekly to Promote the Good (Yangshan
banyue kan) and its successor The Immortals’ Way Monthly (xiandao yuebao), and
stripped them of their esoteric language to make them fit within a modern scientific
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discourse. As Liu argues, “Chen sought to preserve and continue the Daoist tradition of
inner alchemic practice by reformulating it as part of ‘Daoist learning’ (daojiao zhi
xueshu 道教之学术) closely associated with the now-sanctioned discourse of science,” and
utilized a modern qigong method to supplement public health methods.47 In so doing, he
was repositioning the core of the Daoist tradition. As Dean argues, through the Zhengyi
sect’s hereditary teaching, “the central beliefs of Taoism are… a set of ‘secret’ methods
to assure the efficacy of the ritual.”48 Chen de-emphasized this secrecy, calling for all
scriptures to be made public and widely publicizing Daoist techniques.49 They promoted
and theorized the Qigong 气功 movement and ‘literati Daoism’ (wenren daojiao 文人道教),
distancing these practices and teachings from their ritual importance.50 All of these
reforms are popular today in the writings of the CTA and in their public presentation
because these forms of Daoism are appealing to a modern audience.
These modern Daoists were very involved in the same concerns of Chinese
cultural identity and sought them in the indigenous Daoist tradition. Chen claimed not
just that Daoism was the indigenous religion, but wanted to establish “the school of the
Divine Immortals [神仙家] as the origin of all intellectual, cultural, and religious traditions
in China,”51 tracing its lineage back to the Yellow Emperor. Their alchemical practices
manipulated the spirit (shen 神) and vital force (qi 气) and strengthened the Chinese nation
by cultivating an authentic Chinese body, making “the Daoist inner alchemic body… the
site and conduit for the production of cultural nationalism, and the personal pursuit of
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self-transformation came to be linked with the Republican state’s quest for a new
citizenship and cultural norms in the 1930s and 1940s.”52
While literati Daoists were re-imagining the Daoist alchemical and cultural
identity, so too were government officials. In the “Standards for Preserving and
Abandoning Gods and Shrines” put out by Xue Dubi of the Ministry of the Interior in late
1928, Xue emphasized the Daoist figures of Yuanshi Tianzun, Taishang Laozun, and
Zhang Daoling, but he ignored the scriptural tradition so central to the liturgy and ignored
all other divinities in favor of those three historical figures. Further, the Standards
advocated True Daoists to “devote themselves to the course of self-improvement outlined
in the Daodejing, censor anyone who dealt in incantations and charms, and reject the
employment of priests at funerals.”53 In this way, from the Republican period,
“Householding priests, who were the vast majority of the Taoist clergy, were granted no
religious status whatsoever, and were stigmatized as promoters of feudal superstition,”54
a diminished status that has lasting effects to this day.
The movements taking place from the New Culture period up into the 1940s show
how Daoists attempted to modernize Daoism. Literati Daoists were not officially
ordained but they studied the teachings made available through magazine publications.
They opposed esoteric and superstitious understandings of Daoist teachings, instead
choosing to use more scientific understandings to explain the efficacy of Daoist practices.
They also attempted to form national organizations in line with the new secular cultural
understandings. By studying their tradition as an historical phenomenon discoverable in
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texts, they fit Daoism within an academic space and de-emphasized secret liturgical
traditions that did not accommodate this form of democratization of knowledge. If the
tradition fit along these modern lines, they could be a valuable core component of
Chinese culture and these features continue in the current revitalization of Daoism today.
Contemporary Daoism as Presented by the CTA
One aspect of modernizing religions in China mentioned earlier, “partifying”
(danghua 党化), remains important to the CTA. While the requirement of religious
organizations to promote socialism, patriotism, and the national ideology was dropped in
2004,55 this does not mean that doing so has stopped. This is still something that the
national organizations are called to do and one means of maintaining their credibility.
The latest version of the CTA charter provided on their website still maintains the
language of promoting socialism. It reads in part,
The purposes of this organization are to promote unity, lead all Daoists in
the nation to love the country and love the religion, protect the Communist
Party’s goals of implementing socialism, obey the national constitution
and legal regulations, provide training in the core socialist values, and
promote the active adaptation [of Daoism] to socialism.”56
Towards this end you see articles in the Chinese Taoist Association’s magazine with
titles such as, “All Chinese Taoist Association Education Professionals Study and
Discuss General Secretary Hu’s Perspective on Establishing the Socialist Perspective on
the Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces”57 and “A Discussion of Daoist Culture and the
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Construction of the Socialist Harmonious Society,” amongst many others.58 Furthermore,
the head of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA), Wang Zuoan 王作安,
often produces articles on Daoism and Socialism and attends events with the CTA, as
well as making lengthy statements at various research conferences for Buddhism and
Daoism.59 This is just to note the primacy of socialism and compliance with the
government in legitimating the national religion associations, even if the local
associations are not required in all instances to promote socialism or the interests of the
Communist Party. Much of the CTA’s regulations center around an emphasis on
promoting the legal practices of Daoists around the country and promoting the goals of
socialism.
CTA regulations also illustrate well the importance of the term culture in
legitimating their activities and the role of this cultural discourse in deconstructing the
Daoist tradition into socially appealing components. The third item under their important
work and duties includes the goal of “vigorously promoting the outstanding Daoist
culture.”60 The eighth item calls for the CTA to “develop Daoist cultural art exchange
activities, strengthen academic research, compile and publish Daoist research materials,
and provide assistance in the protection of Daoist relics, historical sites, and intangible
cultural heritage.”61 Further, in their items advocating their role in strengthening ties
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between the mainland, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and foreign countries, they group these
activities under “Daoist cultural exchanges.”62
The aspects of Daoism that they note in their charter are indeed the types of
Daoist culture that they promote in wider events and on their website. The most widely
publicized event for Chinese Daoism was the International Forum on the Daodejing. It
lasted for a week in April of 2007 and was touted for its role in promoting the
cooperation between the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong.63 It involved many highlevel officials and international figures, and in the quotes provided in most articles they
advocated Daoism and the Daodejing as cultural resources for China and the world. Jia
Qinglin, Chairman of the CPPCC National Committee, was quoted as saying, "Daodejing
is part of the critical canon in Chinese traditional culture.”64 Zhang Jiyu, Vice-Chairman
of the CTA, made statements to clear up “misunderstandings” about Daoism and its
relation to superstitious activities and argued that, "Its culture belongs to the entire
world…. We should be proud of Daodejing and Taoism since it can increase our own
cultural self-confidence as a nation."65 Leaders involved in this conference all highlighted
the cultural value of Daoism and identified the core of Daoism as a culture of harmony.
As high-profile as this event was and acknowledging its uniquely wide publicity
amongst Daoist cultural events, it shares much of the same characteristics with all Daoist
cultural events. They stress the textual basis for the tradition and its rich philosophy, its
ability to draw upon international groups of Daoists, its value towards promoting peace
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and environmental awareness, and its colorful cultural components such as music and
martial arts. While little is generally written in English about the CTA or Daoism in
China generally, what is written highlights these aspects or its charitable given, for
instance its donation of 1.1 million yuan in 2010 to the orphaned survivors of an
earthquake in SW China.66 The CTA also published alongside other Daoist groups the
“China Daoist Ecology Protection Eight Year Plan (2010-2017)” in which they provided
an outline for their ecological projects that included some quotes from the Daodejing to
back their program and included plans to utilize most aspects of their teaching, events,
and daily life to promote ecological awareness. This included the plan to institute youth
camps, prayer, ritual, and story-telling to advance this goal.67 Ecological awareness
features prominently in the CTA’s media presence.
The CTA promotes stories on its website under its Daoist culture, Daoist lifestyle,
and Daoist activities sections that likewise fit into these themes. Headlines include stories
on research conferences discussing nurturing life, Daoist roots of Chinese medicine, and
scriptures. The other large scale events that attract some international participants but
focus primarily on domestic tourism include such components as Taiji, martial arts,
music, art, calligraphy, scriptural studies, and the ever-present prayer for world peace.68
Another aspect of the CTA website that indicates a secularization and
academicization of their presentation are the images selected to show what goes into
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living a Daoist life. They include eleven images of “Daoist activities” and, of these, five
are in conference rooms, two are award ceremonies on stages, one is a secular music
festival, and three are ceremonies for big events such as the ghost festival.69 They include
twelve images under “Daoist lifestyle” (道门生活) of which three are students writing in
classrooms, one is a tree planting activity, two are meditation, two are Taiji, one is
scripture copying, one is a graduation ceremony, and two are lineage ceremonies.70 These
types of activities gain most credence in the online and media presentations of Daoism,
but it is important to note what is missing from this presentation.
The Place of Non-Monastic Priests in Online Presentation
As noted above, the CTA is run by the monastic sect of Daoism, Quanzhen. The
non-monastic sect, Zhengyi, has seen a diminishing role in the public face of Daoism in
China and internationally. In an interview with the CTA and Wudangshan President, Li
Guangfu 李光富, it is clear the degree to which the non-monastic monks of the Zhengyi
tradition are disenfranchised by the primary status of the Quanzhen sect. The Quanzhen
sect had already received privileged status under the Qing Dynasty because their
monastic orientation was seen as more pure than the non-monastic monks, but use of the
Internet to promote Quanzhen views only strengthens the reach of their bias against nonmonastics monks. Li Guangfu’s five criteria for being a true Daoist are (1) Practice in a
monastery, (2) Observance of the Monastic Discipline, (3) Study of the Daoist teachings,
(4) Honor of the Dao and Respect of its Virtue (尊道贵德), and (5) Spreading Daoism.71
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The first two of these qualifying traits for a true Daoist display an open preference for the
Quanzhen style of Daoism. In fact, Li Guangfu addresses the failing of non-monastic
Daoists of the Zhengyi tradition, huoju 火居, giving them a secondary status and marking
their subordination by saying, “Even though Daoism has huoju Daoists who don’t leave
home, they still have to register their danwei at a temple, and they have to practice Daoist
meditation at temples.”72 This seems to admit non-monastic individuals within the Daoist
tradition in a begrudging fashion, always acknowledging them as not truly Daoist.
The registration through temples is a key way in which to distinguish those who
are legitimate monks and those who are frauds. The government in 2014 published
further means of identifying fake monks and fraudulent Daoism through a searchable
website of registered monasteries and temples.73 Illegal activities they highlight are
“fortune-telling and the sales of expensive incense and souvenirs.”74 In this way, both the
leaders of the CTA and the government officials are attempting to purify their tradition,
both often using the language of purity and social welfare.75
The CTA website includes a document on regulations for these Zhengyi priests.
Under its tab for regulations within the CTA, it includes the regulating document
amendments from the August 24, 1998, sixth session of the CTA representative
conference. First thing to note is that they refer to the Zhengyi priests as “scattered” or
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“living scattered about” (sanju 散居) and they seem to view them as a problem to be dealt
with. As part of their management, the CTA includes a list of activities that they cannot
undertake, saying, “Spirit-writing, playing a god (跳神), fortune-telling, face-reading,
exorcising demons, engaging in fengshui, and other such feudal-superstitious activities
that harm society and the health of the people must all be prohibited.”76 In effort to
manage the parts of the Daoist tradition that do not fit modernity, the CTA lists many of
the activities that a non-monastic Zhengyi priest or huoju might be most likely to
participate in within their local community. This is one step that attempts to operate
within the present day regulations dictated by the modernist state that takes seriously the
distinction between religion and superstition. This does not mean that these very
prohibited actions will not or do not continue to be a vital part of the community, it just
means that they are not visible to an international audience looking at the activities of
‘true Daoists’ in China.
When the huoju appear in articles on the Internet through news outlets, to the
extent that they are present at all, they are most often part of music troupes. This fits their
acknowledged role in community ritual festivals as entertainers and performers. Yang
Der-Ruey, in his study of the traditional skills training for huoju Daoist priests,
emphasizes the importance of skills in blowing, striking, writing, reciting and singing,
setting, arranging, pitching, drawing and coloring. These varied skills should enable them
to handle all aspects of performances or opera staging within local ritual.77 In Tam Wai
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Lun’s fieldwork he shows the importance of music and entertainment in the repertoire of
these Daoist priests, saying,
At night the Daoists performed comedies by making fun of some religious
terms and ritual instruments first, and then afterward explaining their
meaning to the laughing audience. This obviously had a religious
educational value. The Daoists used a moon-block frequently to check that
everything they did was done correctly.78
This religious value and ritual centered entertainment is the traditional role of these
priests in the communities and within the religious revival in China they are once again
occupying this role. For the purposes of this paper, the disparity between this active and
lively ritual function of priests and the secular presentation given through cultural articles
on websites indicates the re-orientation of these skills within the discursive safe-space of
culture in contemporary China.
Searching for articles publicizing the activities of huoju for a national audience
turns up very little. The articles I found include one on the basics of these Daoist priests
in encyclopedic fashion, linking them to primitive practices and rhetorically distancing
them from present significance,79 the aforementioned interview where the Quanzhen
leader of the CTA de-values their place in Daoism, and the remaining articles highlight
their musical performances or clothing.80 Very little in these articles indicates their
continued relevance to village life or their positive value in contemporary life.
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The CTA website has articles on music performances included as parts of their
section on Daoist culture. However, much like what one might find in a newspaper, the
music skills that were previously linked to traditional ritual songs and skills, are always
depicted as part of larger competitions of various music troupes or colleges and done in
concert halls.81 Notably absent is any indication that today these priests are playing music
for the purposes of religious education or for ritual observance. In the presentations for a
wider national audience, these priests are valued for their cultural skills divested of ritual
or religious significance. Because this contrasts with their historical role and with the data
obtained by ethnographers in Southeast China, this shift in emphasis and presentation
style by the media shows a significant impact of the cultural discourse in China. It shows
one more way in which Daoist practices or skills are repackaged for an audience in a way
that is non-threatening, non-superstitious, and non-religious.
Daoist Summer Camps
One important avenue that Daoists in China are pursuing in effort to revitalize the
tradition is the organization of Dao culture summer camps. While they are fairly recent in
origin, with the first nationally organized camp starting in 2014, they show one more way
that the language of culture provides a safe space for a form of Daoism appropriate on the
national and international stage. In one article published about the most recent Daoist
summer camp, the article provided two images of young participants, one of them
engaging in Taiji and another of them marching in a line across the grounds behind
Daoist masters. In what they bill as a “One Week Dao Culture Summer Camp”
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(一周道文化夏令营), they list the activities provided for the students and describe the
schedule of a typical day. The participants learn about the traditional instruments the
guqin and the guzheng, tea culture, Dao culture general knowledge (道文化常识), Daoist
medicine, cultivating life meditation, Taiji, and scripture copying and recitation, as well
as having a campfire talk and some outings.82 In this way the article shows the way in
which Daoist culture can be disassembled and utilized in ways that are almost entirely
secular, teaching components that belong to a larger Chinese traditional culture.
The article also takes you through a typical day at the summer camp. Some of the
activities are particular to the Daoist tradition and have an ostensibly religious purpose,
such as the early morning scriptural recitations and a prayer for national peace. Just as the
larger national conferences or ceremonies all include a prayer for world peace, these are
activities that seem to rely upon some religious beliefs, but are easily appreciated by
those who do not hold beliefs because most people would not object to the sentiment of
world peace. Further, while they are reciting scriptures, the only scripture mentioned by
name in the article is the Daodejing which is the most widely known and respected text
within the Daoist canon, giving it the widest possible appeal. When they had four
children reciting the Daodejing in traditional Han garb after a guqin and a guzheng
performance, these presentations were described as the first class in traditional culture.
Indeed, all of these activities had the purpose of letting participants “experience for
themselves the typical daily life in a Daoist monastery, learn about Dao culture, and
understand Dao culture.”83 The author further asserts this connection between Daoism
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and traditional culture by saying, “When we are discussing the promotion and spread of
traditional culture, we first need to re-introduce ourselves to it.”84 These culture camps
are in part an introduction to Dao culture and at least equally a re-introduction to aspects
of traditional culture.
In most instances above I have translated the term dao wenhua 道文化 as “Dao
culture” rather than Daoist culture. This is in effort to acknowledge the language game
that the Daoist leaders and organizers of these camps are themselves playing. In an article
published in Hong Dao 弘道Magazine in 2014, they include an article in question and
answer format in order to properly communicate the cultural rather than religious nature
of these camps. The first question addresses this very distinction, asking, “Why is this
camp called Dao culture camp (dao wenhua xialingying 道文化夏令营) and not Daoist
culture camp (daojiao wenhua xialingying 道教文化夏令营)?” The response is, in part,
“Historically Dao came first, then Daoism. The Dao and aspects of this culture are the
root and mainstream of Chinese culture. If you really want to understand, you need the
whole spectrum, not just the religion. So this summer camp uses the Daoist grounds as a
means of spreading the best of traditional Chinese culture.”85 Thus, from the start the
author is uniting a select part of the Daoist tradition with the core of Chinese culture and
advocating an emphasis on aspects that can stand separate from the religious aspects.
The next question asks, “If it isn’t a religious activity, just a cultural event, why is
it done with these religious people in this religious place? How can it still just be a
cultural event?” The author, He Jianming, responds in part by saying,
The core of religion is culture. According to the laws of China, religious
rituals and activities based on beliefs are not appropriate for youth in
84
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college (or before), but we can do cultural activities in accordance with
Chinese law. At the summer camp, participants absolutely will not be
required to kneel or worship before Daoist deities, become believers in
Daoism, or leave home to become Daoist monks/nuns. We just want to
allow them to personally practice and experience splendid and treasured
parts of our treasure trove of traditional culture.86
This response undoubtedly is referencing the well-established understanding of freedom
of religion in China which preferences the freedom from religion, as was reaffirmed in
the legal regulations laid out in the 2004, article 2.87 In response to the question of how
youth participants are to interact with religion and religious personnel, the author can
delineate the boundaries within which non-believing youth can legally interact with
Daoist culture and feel safe from pressure towards any belief. The key to this renewed
contact and outreach by the Daoists is the safe space of culture, but here it is clear that the
doorway into Daoism is guarded against purely religious proselytizing or coercion. The
question He Jianming poses, after noting the vastly greater popularity of Confucian
learning these days compared to Daoist learning, is if we don’t have knowledge of
Daoism, “how can we possibly say we have truly passed on Chinese traditional
culture?”88
Acknowledging the complicated nature of Daoism in modern China as dictated by
the discourse of religion and superstition, the author addresses the problem of the
superstitious practices within Daoism. The question posed in the magazine is, “When we
experience Daoist culture it really seems unique and special, but we see Daoists doing
fortune telling, divination, fengshui, acting like gods and ghosts, and this seems too
superstitious, to the point that society has a strange impression of Daoism and Daoists.
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How do you resolve this problem?” The author does what other Daoist leaders do in other
places and argues that historical development has polluted the tradition with practices
unsuitable to the present times. He argues that,
During its history, development and transformation, it adapted to various
times and not everything was for every time, and some of the things just
suited one period’s society, people, beliefs, and needs. This has led it to
have great aspects but also some unsuitable aspects…. But all the things
we teach as part of Daoist culture are the things that are suitable for all
times and all peoples.89
This argument from historical particularity allows one to argue, in the Chinese idiom
utilized by the author, that the fish and the dragons have mixed together (yu long hunza
鱼龙混杂), and, in an English idiom, not throw out the baby with the bathwater. But more
than this, his response carries with it the notion of a modern world religion that has
teachings valid for any place and any people at any time. It is particularly interesting that
He references questionnaires given to participants in previous sessions, saying,
“Questionnaires from participants in three previous camps indicate that they were very
opposed to these practices, and even advocated these as areas needing reform.”90 The
reforms on the Daoist tradition reflect the interests of the new generation and the leaders
of the camp are listening to their concerns in efforts to reform. These practices, once
quite central to the Daoist tradition and the Zhengyi sect in particular, are now relegated
to the past as tertiary aspects of a pure tradition.
Conclusion
The Religious Revival that has been happening in China in the post-Mao years
relies upon a new discursive safe-space centered around the idea of culture. This is clear
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from almost any article one reads on the CTA’s website and the ubiquitous use of the
term throughout all publicized Daoist events. From the charter of the CTA to the
construction of its web content to the international activities it carries out, all utilize the
idea of traditional culture or an appealing idea of harmonious Daoist culture. Two results
of this discourse for the current Daoist tradition in China that I have highlighted are the
deconstruction of the tradition into components appealing to the wider society and
stripped of any overt religious content, and the relegation of the Zhengyi sect’s nonmonastic Daoists to near invisibility in the outward presentation of Daoism. The
interaction of Daoist priests with popular religious practices is almost entirely absent,
despite the importance of the cultural discourse in allowing these local religious activities
to resume after the Cultural Revolution. While the term is useful on both the local and the
national levels to allow most religious activities to resume that were once prohibited, the
pervasive ideas of modernity about universality of religious messages and disavowal of
superstitious acts in favor of rational or philosophical values has meant that the official
presentation of Daoism as traditional culture has involved a virtual disappearance of
ritual activities for the national or international audience.
In the case of Daoists in contemporary China, they have made many arguments
attempting to equate Daoist culture with traditional Chinese culture. They have argued
that Daoism is the root of Chinese culture, that you could not understand Chinese culture
without understanding Daoism, and that the wonderful components of Chinese culture
from the guzheng to calligraphy to medicine and Taiji all belong fundamentally to the
Daoist tradition. In some instances they have successfully promoted themselves as
arbiters of traditional Chinese culture, such as in the International Forum on the
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Daodejing and in tourism activities at various temples. In the following section we will
examine the place of various religious traditions in another international presentation of
traditional Chinese culture, that which is constructed by the Confucius Institute abroad.
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CHAPTER 4: CULTURE IN THE CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE
Introduction
In the cultural revival in China, as seen in the previous chapter, many of the
cultural institutions linking China to the international community are linked to religious
revitalization. Temple reconstruction draws upon investment from diasporic Chinese
communities, temples function as tourist attractions, and religious groups organize
conferences on their traditions and texts. While local communities and religious
organizations function within the cultural discourse in these ways to foster an
international image for China, the Chinese national government also seeks to formulate
its own cultural presentations to an international audience through the use of government
sponsored institutes of Chinese language and culture: Confucius Institutes (CIs).
Acknowledging that religion is a difficult component of the modern Chinese cultural
identity and also that it is often the subject of suspicion in the modern political arena, I
seek in this chapter to identify the role religious traditions play in presenting Chinese
culture in the work of the Confucius Institutes.
In order to understand how the Confucius Institute constructs a Chinese cultural
identity and the place of religion within this identity, I will examine some official
presentations organized by the CI and also the way teachers construct this identity
through their lessons. Through these presentations I argue that, from the perspective of CI
teachers and staff, religion as a Chinese cultural component requires too much
explanation and involves too much risk of misunderstanding to be useful in Confucius
Institute programming directed at language learners and new learners of Chinese culture.
Further, it appears that the cultural revival in China does not make these religious
traditions more suitable in the minds of the young teachers for inclusion in Chinese
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culture or presentations thereof. Three primary factors influence the negotiations of
cultural components, namely, historical importance, contemporary relevance, and foreign
interest or knowledge. Due to religion’s difficult place in modernity and the potential for
misunderstandings from foreigners, teachers do not incorporate religion in the classroom.
Thus, even if traditional ideas from Confucianism or Daoism are often seen as the core of
Chinese culture, they are only presented as symbols or passed over completely in favor of
the straightforward, uncontested cultural products such as food, music, and traditional
clothing.
Methods and Structure of Study
This chapter is based on interviews and field observation conducted between
September of 2015 and April of 2016. I conducted twenty-four interviews with thirteen
CI teachers and staff, one Chinese language teacher outside of the CI at a US university,
two university directors related to the CI, two Chinese exchange students, and three
American students with varying interactions with the CI. Two interviews were group
interviews conducted in person, the remainder were conducted either via video chat with
teachers located in various schools around the US or in person with teachers in the
Southern United States. Teachers were almost all instructors of beginning Chinese and all
instructed outside of the university context, either teaching community members or K-12
students. This reflects a move within the US to keep CI instruction outside of universities
for reasons that will be discussed below.
Interviews were semi-structured, starting with initial questions on teacher
experiences with the CI and their understandings of Chinese culture and cultural
instruction. In a secondary round of questions I structured responses around a selection of
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fourteen images intended to depict a variety of Chinese cultural forms. These images
included what could be considered uncontroversial, simple cultural images such as
Chinese food or the Great Wall, and more complicated images of religious symbols or
religious activities within China. This technique was used in an attempt to elicit longer
responses during interviews with more in-depth discussion of the subject matter,
following the work using photo elicitation discussed by Jeffrey Samuels. I had
interviewees rank the images into three categories: very important, somewhat important,
and not important, and then had them explain their ranking. I will attach point values to
these rankings of 10, 5, and 0 respectively and compare their average ratings in the
discussion. Nine teachers were shown these images, which can be seen in order in the
appendix.
In addition to these formal interviews, I also attended various cultural events put
on by the CI and other Chinese cultural organizations on US college campuses and in
communities in the Southern United States. Additional informal conversations with CI
teachers and the author’s own experience on a CI cultural exchange trip in the Summer of
2015 inform the discussion. Responses were in both Chinese and English depending on
the comfort of the respondent. Translated responses, all the author’s own, will be
indicated by italics.
All of the interviews will be discussed in reference to the larger scholarly
conversation on CI activities around the globe and compared with official CI
presentations. There are obvious limitations to the scope of this study, given the limited
interactions and time period under discussion. However, I think these initial inquiries into
the actual cultural understandings of those attempting to share and construct a Chinese
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cultural presentation to a foreign audience is necessary and beneficial to understanding
the actions of Chinese teachers sent out by the Chinese government.
CI Background and Scholarship
The first official CI was opened in Seoul, South Korea, in 2004 and since this first
CI, the expansion of CIs around the world has been unprecedented. The activities of the
CI include language instruction and community engagement centered around two kinds
of locations, CIs on university campuses and CIs are established on university campuses
and Confucius Classrooms located in K-12 schools or other community locations. As of
2012, there were 322 CIs and 369 Confucius Classrooms operating in 96 countries, with
81 CIs and 299 Confucius Classrooms in 48 states in the US alone.1 According to a 2015
Annual Report, that number had increased to more than 495 CIs around the world and
109 in North America, showing their ambitious and rapid expansion.2 Within the state of
Kentucky, their 2015 Annual Report highlights that from 2010 to 2016 they went from 11
to 47 Hanban teachers for an increase of 327 percent, from 4 to 21 school districts for an
increase of 425 increase, and from 1600 to 13580 students for an increase of 748
percent.3
The most useful and appropriate understanding of CIs is as a form of ‘cultural
diplomacy,’ a subfield of ‘public diplomacy.’ As noted by Kwan, “Public diplomacy is
defined as a nation's effort to influence the actions of a foreign government through
influencing the attitudes of its citizens... Furthermore, a country may resort to its arts and
culture to make a positive impression upon a foreign population as a strategy of public
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Chi-Cheung Leung and Hilary du Cros. “Confucius Institutes: Multiple Reactions and Interactions,”
China: an International Journal, vol.12 no.2 (Aug. 2014), 73, 77.
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WKU Confucius Institute Annual Report, (2015), 2.
3
WKU Confucius Institute Annual Report, (2015), 2-3.
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diplomacy. This is known as cultural diplomacy...”4 Culture in this form is a national
commodity which can be packaged and presented to other populations to produce
appealing impressions and sway opinions of the country as a whole. Because the
government sends out cultural representatives, scholars assume the values the CI
promotes are those that the government wants promoted. However, the term ‘cultural
diplomacy’ is broad enough to encompass things from arts to political propaganda,
meaning that these institutes may contain political propaganda but not of necessity.5 This
breadth of content creates possibilities for misunderstandings, and if the spreading of
culture is seen as forceful, it can be termed cultural hegemony, cultural imperialism, or
cultural colonialism.6 Some claim that the initiation of an application by the hosting
university shows that it is not China promoting or actively pushing itself on others, but
rather the Chinese government responding to an organic desire in countries around the
world for Chinese language training and program funding.7
There is some survey indication of success at producing positive impressions of
China,8 but most scholars note the failure to sway a foreign public on a “values level,”9

4

Kwan, “Cultural Diplomacy,” 111.
These are government forms of ‘soft power’ which Joseph Nye Jr. introduced in Soft Power:The Means
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the Chinese people. This is their policy of cultural aggression. And it is carried out through missionary
work, through establishing hospitals and schools, publishing newspapers and inducing Chinese students to
study abroad.” Marsh, Religion and the State, 166. For some support for Mao’s claims, see Schmidt,
“Democracy for China,” 1–28.
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Kwan, “Cultural Diplomacy,” 114.
8
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from the Cultural,” Issues & Studies, vol.50 no.4 (Dec. 2014), 71.
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referring to political values and assuming that Chinese values are distinct from the values
of the host country. This assumption that the Chinese government is a source of
threatening values and is attempting to infiltrate institutions in host countries to change
their feelings away from democratic and free forms of government is central to most
studies on the institute and needs to be challenged.
The two central controversies of the CIs in the US are their location and
educational content. Unlike other cultural institutes, CIs are installed on college
campuses rather than in off-campus or community buildings. Scholars perceive this as a
threat to the values of the modern university, namely free and unhindered inquiry on all
subjects, because the Chinese government’s contract may infringe upon the free inquiry
into subjects deemed politically sensitive. Indeed, there have been a few widely
publicized instances where this does seem to be the case, regarding inquiry into the topics
of Taiwan and Tibet,10 and respondents in other studies have noted self-censorship.11
Hughes best articulates these two concerns about the conflict of a university ethic
and the Chinese government. He says, “The question of which values are being promoted
by the CIs is what is important for universities in democratic societies,”12 and ties
Chinese cultural education back to Chairman Mao’s views on the use of the arts to
promote socialism. Hughes quotes current Chinese President Xi Jinping calling on
teachers and officials to “implement the Party’s literature and art principles and policies
well, and grasp the correct orientation of literature and art development.”13 This means
for Hughes that the use of cultural products is employed to promote a single party and an
10
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anti-democratic interest, as that describes the political status of China at present. It
certainly indicates that party officials still view the instilling of values and manipulation
of culture for its own citizens as a central goal of governing their nation, something
discussed above as central to all nations. He does not see it as a benign fact that “three of
the sixteen members of the Hanban’s governing Council are also members of the CCP
Central Committee.”14 Further, “Like Chinese universities, the CIs operate under the
higher education law that is designed to serve the Chinese Communist Party by
promoting ‘socialist material and spiritual civilization’ and upholding the ideological
orthodoxy of ‘Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory.’”15
This push for a “socialist culture” or “socialist values” in education and cultural
programs inside China may or may not apply to the CIs. The educational goals and ideas
of culture need not be identical for a domestic and a foreign audience. However, Nguyen,
quoting a People’s Daily article from November 2012, sees evidence that in the Chinese
state media, culture is explicitly tied to socialism and that this is intended for the CIs as
well when the author emphasizes “the importance of the Confucius Institute as an
instrument to bring the Chinese communist cultural values to the world.”16 Xu Lin, the
Hanban General Director remarked at the opening of a CI in Vietnam that it was a
“golden opportunity, not only a symbol of friendship but also a landmark of strengthened
ties between the communist parties in both countries.”17 From this it seems that, on the
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official level, many Chinese leaders do view their cultural presentation through the CI as
tied to their politics and understand culture in China today as linked to communism or
socialism.
The 2015 Annual Report for Western Kentucky University (WKU) illustrates how
the directors of the CI are aware of the controversy. Not only was concern over
controversy apparent during many of the initial interviews with program directors that I
conducted, in their training session in 2015 for program directors they included three
items, the second of which was “How to Deal with Negative Publicity.”18 In response,
Ms. Bo Li, the Chinese Director from North China Electric Power University in Beijing,
said,
One of the tones that must be established is that the CI program is not an
‘Academic Unit,’ and does not set curriculum, recruit students, or hire
faculty. The CI program is only a feeder program into these Chinese/Asian
studies programs on campus…. As with any good intention, there will be
unintended consequences. Everyone is not going to buy into the programs’
mission, and will continue to look at the program as Chinese propaganda,
a take-over, or soft power…. [N]ot speaking with the journalist, and not
being transparent, will send the message that the CI is hiding something,
and that there is something more going on. However, in doing so, one
must be strategic about what is said, how it is said, and ensure that what is
being presented is exactly what the CI wants shared.19
Image is very important for the CI and directors are aware that they face suspicions from
host universities. But evident in these comments is that they are carefully crafting their
presentation of the Institutes and it makes sense to assume that they also carefully craft
their cultural presentations to avoid these fears of socialist propaganda in the host
community. Creating and emphasizing a separation from direct university involvement is
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one way to avoid criticisms like those of Hughes above, but transparency is their main
strategy, assuming that all their activities and messages fit into a well crafted message.
The effort to separate culture and politics is not just a concern of the Chinese
officials, but also of leaders in the host universities. During a training event I attended for
CI teachers in 2015, Gary Ransdell, WKU President, made opening remarks and in them
he brought up the issue of politics in an effort to create a space between politics and
culture. He said that both sides of the partnership should create a space between the
politics, the people, and the relationship between the two countries and cultures.
Ultimately he was acknowledging that politics was a non-starter based upon the issues
noted above, but you don’t have to embrace the politics in order to want this relationship
and have mutual respect. It is this negotiation between different problematic spaces that
seemingly must occur for these cultural exchanges to take place.
Noting these negotiations, while culture may be defined as “socialist” in some
sense on an official level, this does not mean that instructors see it that way, nor does it
reflect the understandings of the foreign audience. While there is much to be praised
about the concerns scholars are raising, my interviews with teachers and participation in
various CI hosted events indicates that they are connected to “socialist culture” in only
the most accidental way, namely connection to the Chinese state. Their espoused desire
for transparency towards a well crafted message means that all they teach is meant to be
made visible to the foreign audience and to be appealing. While other institutes, such as
the Goethe Institute, may have explicitly political missions, Chinese culture from the CIs
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is as explicitly apolitical as possible.20 In what follows I will examine what teachers and
recipients of Chinese culture understand by their use of the term and their rationale for
the items they include in a presentation thereof.21 My focus is on religion’s presence or
absence from these presentations and the rationale for its place inside these cultural
presentations. This will move the focus away from discussion of socialism and into the
assumptions of modernity more broadly made by teachers when presenting an image that
a foreign audience will appreciate and presenting China as a modern state, not a
communist state.
Goals and Dynamics of Cultural Education
Much of the dynamics of the cultural revival discussed in the previous chapter
function primarily within the Chinese nation for the purposes of legitimizing a traditional
cultural identity amongst fellow Chinese. The CI utilizes the same discourse but, in

20
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discussing the effectiveness or even applicability of Chinese culture as ‘socialist culture’ seems
inappropriate.
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employing the cultural discourse in foreign communities, has different goals. Rather than
the revival of traditions in a place where they once thrived, CI administrators and
teachers are introducing aspects of Chinese culture in communities that have never had
them before. The goals belong much more straightforwardly to the realm of cultural
diplomacy. Chinese teachers imagined their typical audience to which they would present
Chinese culture and this audience’s perceived concerns. This audience determined the
culture taught. For the interviews, I served as a representation of this audience as a white,
American male, but would also often be contrasted with the imagined standard audience
because of my perceived background knowledge.
The teachers expressed a nationalistic love of China that they hoped would be
spread to Americans. They wanted to show something that would interest students and
foster affection or love for China. But this was always played against the idea that
Americans had either little idea about China or only negative misunderstandings.
Representative understandings of their audience, either their young students or the wider
community, can be seen from some standard responses. Pam remarked, “But if you go to
a small school in Kentucky, they only know ‘China,’ they don’t know China anything…”
Chrystal put her hopes and goals for culture lessons this way:
I hope that Americans can learn more about China. You know, some
Americans or some, you know, students… they have some
misunderstandings… Some things they don’t know about, don’t
understand about China. This is common, … And because China actually
has a lot of culture, and really excellent culture, then in my
teaching…some traditional culture, foreigners… maybe they just know a
little, they only know a little but they don’t know the meaning. I hope…
We are original Chinese. I hope that when we come here we broadcast
Chinese and Chinese culture, they understand deep… deeply (laughter).
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It’s hard to say how effective they are at communicating this meaning, but the teachers
and administrators put a lot of weight on the ability of an ‘original’ or ‘authentic’ Chinese
person to simply convey the culture through their presence. Their teaching fosters love of
the culture and country while combating misunderstandings by providing education that
hopefully gives students a deep cultural understanding. The misunderstandings about
traditional culture are attributed to lack of awareness and thus all that students need is
some exposure and this should give them a proper understanding of what Chinese culture
means.
Teachers would often assert the greater importance of teaching about modern
China and a greater concern over misunderstandings about modern China, possibly due to
media presentations.22 They wanted to assert a distinction between traditional Chinese
culture and modern China, mapping well onto the cultural imaginings discussed in
chapter two. In a significant sense, Chinese culture was modern and learning about the
traditional things that the CI organized would not give a true understanding of Chinese
culture. However, due to the perceived foreign interest in ancient Chinese culture and the
inability to make Americans understand modern life in China without a direct encounter,
they often chose to teach the traditional components. When asked about whether to teach
modern or traditional culture, responses often looked like Jessica’s, a CI high school
teacher:
I think it's modern China, it's not ancient China. Yes, and the people, the
living way. And now China… it's not old, it's not old country. It's also a
very new country, I mean it's uh, economy and people, and it's different,
22
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totally different from ancient China. And some people their understanding,
or they know something about China, only know something about ancient
China (laugh), or the Qin dynasty, not the modern China.
These responses indicate that the traditional culture is not actually seen as part of modern
day China, or at least is being kept separate, replaced by the notion of a mostly singular,
global culture. This response from Abby, a CI language teacher to elementary and middle
school students, further gets at the dilemma of teaching Chinese culture which is now
fully modern and to which traditional culture has little importance:
If you really want to know a country's people, you need to know their
normal life. All of this stuff is pretty far from regular life (gesturing at
traditional costumes and cultural props). I'm not saying they aren't
important, just that for me I think... not sure how to put it... Of course
when you are abroad and putting on a display of the culture this stuff is a
very good choice, but if you want to really learn about a people group or
country, more important is what's in their daily life… If you don't go learn
about this, you won't understand...23
The Chinese teachers and program organizers seek out those aspects that are most
‘authentic’ to attract the students, playing up the difference between the two groups. A lot
is dependent upon the assumptions that the recipient culture is interested in the
traditional, historical, and dramatically different aspects of Chinese culture, which some
Chinese instructors admit does not constitute actual cultural understanding until students
go and experience the daily life in China. But already evident here and repeated
throughout my interviews is the idea that very little of the historical traditions or cultural
commodities in China are present or relevant in contemporary China.
The Culture They Present

23

Abby, CI teacher and cultural activity organizer. Regarding Chinese costumes and relevance to
contemporary life, this was also supported by Pam and Sarah, a cultural activity organizer, during photo
elicitation.
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CI culture presentations come in a variety of different forms, including classroom
activities, community events, and CI spaces on campuses. In the negotiation of the
modern and the traditional, all of these forms present different possibilities and focuses.
Looking first at the official spaces, each CI has its own focus but all seek to spread
language and cultural instruction in a way that leaves a positive impression of China and
its culture. This is done through crafting events and spaces to present this culture, all
approved from the top down. WKU has a typical CI space where a visitor can see
contents described as “the gems of Chinese culture” consisting of “Chinese artifacts and
folk arts,” such as Chinese traditional dress, instrument displays, tea kettles, etc. In
addition, the WKU CI has seven touch screen videos “highlighting Ancient Chinese
Science & Technology, Chinese Characters, Famous Philosophers, Paper Cutting,
Chinese Musical Instruments, King Fu (sic), and Chinese Cities.”24 These videos or
interactive displays are quite well produced and illustrate some themes in their
presentation. They stress the traditional and show many benign cultural products such as
paper cuts and music. When presenting pieces of their ancient thought they attempt to
demonstrate its value in today’s world, interpreting components of ancient thought as
scientific or philosophical in ways that share great affinity with the National Essence
thinkers. The philosophers presented are Confucius, Zhuangzi, and Laozi, all potentially
linked to a religious tradition, but all reduced to one sentence of insight on four topics:
career, love, study, and friends. Seeing them as philosophers with one sentence to say on
these general topics gives one the impression that they have nothing to do with religion or
divinity whatsoever, which perhaps is the intention of the CI program coordinators. The

24

WKU Confucius Institute Annual Report, (2015), 11.

- 96 -

stress put on the secular and the modern in these presentations of the ancient and
potentially religious resonate with the strategies used by the Daoist tradition in China
shown in the previous chapter.
The main programming for the CI outside of language instruction consists in
community events where they teach about one topic or bring in art troupes. Visiting any
website for a CI will link you to their activities in various Chinese or international
festivals held in local communities around America. They put up booths typically
containing some combination of “calligraphy, chopsticks demonstrations, fan painting,
fan dancing, language table, traditional Chinese musical instruments, and more.”25 Given
that their presentation of China may be the only one that the community sees, the items
they highlight are significant, and their presentations often argue for being both
authoritative and all encompassing.
I attended the Bowling Green International Festival in both 2014 and 2015. This
festival’s primary mission is “to promote appreciation of the various international
cultures and people within our own community.”26 Different communities could present
themselves in different ways. I saw foods for sale, booths selling handicrafts,
organizations such as the WKU Chinese Culture Club selling kitsch and promotional
items, games, and other more political displays. The Burmese and the Irish displays
presented themselves with politics at the center. In contrast, the CI display did not have
kitsch, it did not have modern foods or candies, and it had no discussion of the
complexities of politics or ethnicity in the country. While the Burmese display
highlighted their different ethnic makeup, the CI display gave no indication of the various
25
26
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ethnic groups in China. All items were historical artifacts of the Han high-culture, given
minimal if any context, and presented in an uncomplicated manner as a given and
embodiment of what Chinese culture is. Other Chinese booths presented some modern
things or games or some politics, but the CI stayed clear of this.
The CI booths also did not present historical background or discussion, instead
favoring the interaction with cultural artifacts devoid of context. While CI spaces may
present some form of philosophy or background knowledge, booths at community
festivals did not include this. People could touch the objects of history and play games
and produce their own artifacts, but there was no in depth discussion of either traditional
or modern China. I had some discussions of modern culture with various teachers
volunteering, but these were possibilities opened up by my having already been to China
and having reflections to share and compare.
Looking at the types of lectures put on by universities, there was wide variety
dictated by the focus of the given CI. For instance, University of Michigan and UC Davis
focus on food culture with a lot of programming around Chinese cuisine. Indiana-Purdue
has cultural lectures every week from professors and visiting scholars. University of Utah
has varied lectures including recent ones on the politics of China’s rise and the dynamics
of Xi Jinping’s administration. Most programs focus primarily on language instruction
and scholarship opportunities, but the universities that do focus on providing frequent
lectures and in depth cultural discussions tend to examine the same cultural aspects that
festival booths do, just with more detailed discussion. When the topic of religion is
hosted, the speakers are from America, usually scholars from the host university, and
they always focus on traditional ethics or religion as an historical phenomenon. In this
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way the CI, consciously or not, is supporting the view that these philosophical and
religious traditions are phenomena of the past and separated from contemporary practice.
When talking to teachers with the CI, I asked about the topics they taught and also
had them imagine what they would present to a foreigner if asked about Chinese culture.
Confucianism and religious traditions did not make any of these lists. The list of topics
considered worthy of teaching or that they actually taught mirrors presentations above
and included food, tea ceremony, martial arts, paper cutting, Chinese knots, calligraphy,
painting, colors and their significance, the significance of the Chinese flag, pandas, opera
masks, fans, instruments, Internet slang, songs, dances, origami, Chinese medicine, fairy
tales, the Monkey King, Taiji, and festivals. Some teachers did have required cultural
content, but most teachers did not have a list of topics that they were required to teach
and it is not readily apparent that the Hanban determines all of the topics covered.
However, teachers did receive training prior to being sent to a host country and the
cultural aspects emphasized in training were almost all newly learned by teachers prior to
coming to the US, with various ‘cultural skills’ such as dancing or singing making one a
better candidate. When the teachers did have to teach what the Hanban dictated, as for
Lucy or Carol, this could result in the teachers teaching parts of the culture with which
they were little familiar and being alienated from their cultural presentations, showing
movies and struggling to act as specialists in the subjects that did not actually have a
relation to their daily lives.
Usually, the main factor that determined what teachers taught was student
interests, but this was generally guessed at by teachers. This resulted in presenting the
traditional parts of the Chinese culture, but not in the sense of those core traditions of
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Chinese culture. They taught the simple and the colorful. As Sarah said, "Because I'm
teaching the kid, you know, so it need to be something that is easy for them to
understand. I don't want to teach those very abstract concepts." This is one limiting factor
of cultural education through the Confucius Institute, or through any classroom language
instruction. The content is meant to attract and present a simple image of China, but this
precludes the depth of discussion that results from confronting the ideas that some
identify as the “core” of the culture. Those topics are either too difficult to teach or are
fraught with controversy.
Mary walked me through the selection of topics. She would teach anything she
thought was interesting, then figure out what concrete things could be brought into the
classroom to facilitate an activity. She would teach the Beijing opera because you could
also include mask painting and explanation, the four kinds of characters, the four
important aspects of performance (唱念做打), all of this could be active and tangible, thus
better for instruction.
What teachers said they teach matches with their responses to the images I
showed. Images that I categorize as neutral or simple included the food, panda, Great
Wall, dragon dance, and tea. The panda got a lower average score of 6.5 out of 10
because, upon consideration, a few concluded that it was just an animal and not culture.
But they would still use it in classroom. The Great Wall had more culture and got the
value of 9 out of 10. The food received a score of 9.5. The tea also received a score of
9.5. In considering these cultural components, I identified three primary concerns for
whether something was important to the culture: historical importance, contemporary
relevance, and knowledge or interest of foreigners. Below we will see some examples of
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how this worked with the neutral images. The easiest images were deemed to contain all
of these elements, while more difficult images either lacked one of these or contained a
tension between two or more of the elements.
The true indication of the teachers’ views on these cultural representations comes
through in the quality of their responses. Later we will consider the more difficult images
and the responses they elicited, but the responses elicited for these images were simple,
less detailed, and often quite animated or excited. All of these images were worth
showing to foreigners, regardless of whether they were actually used in class, and there
was rarely hesitation when confronting the images. On the contrary, frequently a squeal
or shriek of excitement was given. All of these responses of relief or excitement should
be seen in contrast to the difficult images that came before in the interview. Some
characteristic features of responses can be seen in responses to the image of food.
Ah! (sigh of relief) The food culture, yeah it’s very, very, very important
(laughs). It’s very important. [How come? Is it something special about
China?] So, nowadays lots of foreigners’ opinions about China is about
the food, right? Yeah, so it’s very important! (She then goes into depth on
the different kinds of food in China (五大菜系).) (Pam)
I love this. I would probably put this the most important. (Emily)
Oh! I told you! Chinese food culture, very important! Very important!
Chinese people are great at eating! (Chrystal)
All of these responses show no question of food’s historical importance and include a
contemporary relevance, either personal or towards a foreign audience. Similarly, the
Great Wall was rated important because it had history, was important as a tourist site, and
(following the frequently stated misconception) could be seen from space. It was
important as a mark of pride for China, had connections with the establishment of the
Chinese empire, and no one had trouble imagining teaching about it. In fact, the only
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teacher who gave it a middle rating did so because she thought her students knew more
about pandas.
After struggling through some images of Islam and ethnic minorities, I showed
them an image of tea. A typical response went like this:
“Ahh! Tea! Yes, this is very important, didn’t I just tell you? Chinese
people really value drinking tea. When Chinese people drink they go sip
by sip. This is very important. This is China’s specialty.” (Chrystal)
"Yeah! It’s the most important I think… For me, this is what foreign
people interested in and this is, uh, truly, it's uh, culture in Chinese.
Special culture in Chinese. You can see the teas, and the Chan (Zen). I
know you, you foreign people like Chan, like that very mystery things, so
I will show this to them, and the tea, you can see the tea. This is not about
tea, it's a culture… Eating culture. And uh, it can reflect the... character of
our Chinese people. It's very peaceful, right?” (Paul)
“Eee! Yes! That's important. [Why is that important?] As important as
calligraphy, and Chinese painting, and Chinese knots. [And why are these
things important?] Uh, western people they cannot understand why we
like drink hot things. They think that's weird, yeah (laughs). You guys like
cold things, and we like warm things… Calligraphy, painting, tea, is a
high level for a very good life quality. 高雅 (elegant, refined) (laughs)."
(Jessica)
Of all the neutral images, the Dragon dance was seen as least important. This was
primarily due to its low contemporary relevance and possible low level of foreigner
knowledge. It got a score of 6 because it was not the best way to represent a festival. A
good response for the dragon was from Jane who said, “It’s wonderful, but it’s not that
close to the modern culture. Maybe it’s fading away and one day it will vanish. But I do
like it.” Paul rated it between very and somewhat important because of the quality of the
picture but said, “But it’s good. At least the people happy, right?” Sarah explained her
rating of somewhat important, saying, “The most important things are the well-known,
every foreigner knows things like Great Wall, but middle things not everyone knows.”
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Responses to these neutral images show the navigation of the three factors,
historical importance, contemporary relevance, and foreign knowledge or interest. When
all three factors were met without conflict, such as in the images of tea or food or the
Great Wall, the images often elicited laughter, joking, and quick responses of approval at
their inclusion in the culture. Further, they were related to the perception of Westerners
and Western interest. They showed a difference or a specialty of China but not one that
included within it perceived complications or potential for misunderstandings. Below we
will see how the religious images related to these factors and the ways in which it created
some complications in presenting the parts of Chinese culture.
Religions and Chinese Culture
Religion is not a topic that CI teachers necessarily avoid, but it does present
problems. As discussed in previous chapters as part of the modern cultural discourse,
religion sits uneasily within the Chinese state and often religion is an object of suspicion.
Similar to the development of official understandings of Chinese culture throughout the
twentieth century, nearly all teachers, in the course of dealing with religious cultural
images, explicitly said that Chinese people have no religion. This was an argument
against contemporary relevance, and navigating their understanding that Chinese are not
religious or have no belief characterized one aspect of their difficulty dealing with the
potentially religious images that I showed them and their place within Chinese culture.
Despite the revival of religion in China, my interviews suggest limited success at
fitting religion within Chinese culture and sustained unease towards religion. One CI
teacher, Paul, recoiled during our second interview when presented with the images of
religious activities, asking, "Are we talking about Chinese culture or Chinese religion?
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Because most of this thing about Chinese religion I think. But I know that's your
major…. Religion is one kind of culture.” Slight irritation or awareness of the repeated
religious images was acknowledged by only one other interviewee, Jessica. Possibly
significant is that both of these teachers identified all images that could be either religious
or philosophical as religious, and thus were confronting many more religious images than
others.
As stated before, the relevant categories for discussing the religious images were
historical importance, contemporary relevance, and foreign knowledge or interest. One
added aspect affecting these first two categories was the notion of belonging to the
‘authentic’ ethnic identity and this decreased if the religion has a foreign origin, thus
decreasing its authenticity within Chinese culture. Another problem with religion in
Chinese cultural presentations was a perceived conflict between the modern and the
historical, which was discussed in terms of modern disappearance and superstition. For
the teachers I spoke to, religion’s contemporary value lay in its benefit to society, but its
main cultural value was historic, thus positioning religious activities outside of a modern
Chinese identity. The metaphysics and philosophy behind native traditions were seen as
persistent and the core to a cultural identity, so close as to be “in the blood,” but this did
not carry over to religious activities, only ideas, fitting with the Enlightenment idea that
religion was something characterized primarily by its internal nature.
Daoism
Daoism acts as the perfect foil to show the intersection of the various discourses
surrounding religion. As noted in the previous chapter, the Daoist tradition sits most
uneasily within a modern identity, linked with local religions and superstitious acts, and
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yet it is also associated with many traditional cultural components, such as martial arts
and medicine, that are proud aspects of Chinese traditional culture. In interviews, I
provided two Daoist images. The first was the symbol known as the Yin-yang or Taiji.
The second was of Daoist ritual taking place in a Daoist temple in front of the three
figures of Buddha, Laozi, and Confucius. The first image of the Taiji symbol received as
high of a score as anything else, 9.5 out of 10. However, the Daoist ritual masters
received a much lower score of 7. There was a score discrepancy as well as much more
difficulty navigating the Daoist practitioners.
The Taiji received quick and excited approval from almost all. Chrystal’s
response contains nearly all of the components of a typical response to this image. This
image comes just after the Christian image which, for her, did not fit the culture and the
typical response starts with some level of excitement, then talks about philosophy,
science or medicine, balance, its long tradition, and possibly influence on other cultures.
Ah! Taiji, very important; Chinese people really value Taiji. Yin-yang, you
know? Yin-yang. Chinese people really respect this. Yin-yang. For
example, if we get sick, we won’t go to see a doctor, we’ll think, ‘Ah! Our
whole body system has problem’… We’ll think that yin-yang has a
problem, out of balance… Right, right, our body’s qi… The whole body
system… This is very traditional, traditional… Yeah, very important. Only
China has this, really!... Ai! But I think Korea,… they also… they value,
they treat the traditional medicine. Very important, because you know, a
long, long time ago, Korea belongs to China.
All respondents were proud of this symbol. Occasionally they noted the fact that
foreigners knew about the Taiji symbol and this made them value it more. Overall, the
symbol was uncontroversial and entirely positive as a representation of culture. It also
was a symbol that was recognizable but had deep meaning rather than just
recognizability.
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The picture of the ritual masters was much more difficult to classify and received
middle marks. Respondents were equally split on whether it was somewhat or very
important and most respondents created a division between the practitioners and the ideas
of Taiji, Yin-yang. They often used the term superstitious to describe the activities, noted
that young people did not do these things or believe in them anymore, and most teachers
spontaneously made an unfavorable comparison of these Daoist Masters to the popularity
of Buddhism. I’ll include two responses to show the way respondents struggled to
interpret the complicated fact of Daoist Masters in Chinese culture.
(Chrystal laughs upon seeing the picture and speaks rapidly.) This is Taiji!
Daoist Masters, aren’t these Daoist Masters? Chinese… uh Chinese
superstition… This is superstition. See, they are worshiping Guanyin, etc.
These Daoist Masters and such, it’s Daoism… Chinese people, how to say
it, Chinese people, they don’t have… belief, right? No religion. But if they
have a wish or desire they will go to the 寺庙, (Buddhist) temple, or 道观
(Daoist temple) to ask this person to give them good fortune or something
like that. It’s like that. Chinese people are very superstitious. Even now.
[Important?]… It’s only in China, but it’s traditional. Nowadays it’s not
popular at all. People these days, young people, like me, they won’t go…
Young people like me won’t believe in these things. [Are the Taiji symbol
and Daoist Masters the same?] Not the same… Because their Daoism,
they can wear this clothing. Daoism is from Taiji, but it’s also, like, their,
they also believe in yin-yang, ba-gua, they also believe in these things.
How about you put it in the middle (importance), because few people
believe these days, especially… People today believe in Buddhism more.
(Chrystal)
Taiji is a symbol, it has some wisdom in it… but for Daojiao [Daoist
religion] I think there are much more things about Daojiao, some bad
things, and I think Taiji is good things. So that’s the reason why I think
Taiji alone is important. But there are so many retard things in Daojiao. I
can’t say in detail, but I think I’ve read things about the bad aspects of
Daojiao. And it didn’t evolve to be a very important religion now. (Jane)
Looking at the practice of Daoism as part of Chinese culture is a much bigger task
than putting the ideas or symbols within Chinese culture. For one, foreigners don’t know
about the rituals and it would breed misunderstanding, while "The Taiji is very famous,
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so it somehow equals the brilliant China. That's how foreigners see China so yeah that is
important" (Peggy). The living Daoist ritual tradition is, in the eyes of these young
teachers, failing to survive in present day China and there is no sense that they want it to
continue. In fact, there is a clear sense that the ideas should be kept and the practices
should be dropped. To the extent that they are important to the culture it is as tradition or
for older generations. It has historical value, but why would this be shown to foreigners?
Foreigners would not understand and it clearly takes a lot more explanation to leave the
proper impression than the Taiji symbol. Respondents had to communicate to me in a
way that I would understand a form of Daoism that was either sanitized as scientific or
medicine, or safely historicized and put in the past rather than the present. Their
responses fit the presentations attempted by the CTA in the previous chapter, though they
stressed even more separation from any kind of religious value and were far less invested
in maintaining the value of Daoism for Chinese culture.
Buddhism
I provided one image of a Buddhist Guanyin statue apparently being celebrated at
a festival by a large group of monastic and lay Buddhists. This image received a slightly
lower culture score than even the Daoist Masters, coming in at 6.7 out of 10. This
highlights a contrast of two factors, Daoism’s authentic Chinese origins and Buddhism’s
contemporary relevance. Thus, it is possible that popularity and present practice is not as
important to cultural value based on origin or authenticity.
As a note on contemporary relevance, most respondents spontaneously
highlighted Buddhism’s greater prevalence and popularity in China today compared to
Daoism. This indicates a competition between the two traditions in their minds, but also
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seems to reflect their awareness of trends in religious surveys on Chinese religion.
Surveys always name Buddhism as the most popular religion in China, coming in at
between 16 and 18 percent of the population or 185 million self-identified Buddhists,
while most statistics put the number of Daoists in China at 1 percent or fewer, with 12
million adherents as an upper limit.27 Teachers’ beliefs match these statistics, however
due to a reliance on Western notions of religious identity and self-reporting this image is
too simplistic.
To find the beliefs of Chinese people hiding outside these self-identifications,
surveys also ask about activities engaged in and beliefs held, though these results rarely
get noted prominently on any website or news story. These questions are important,
however, because for many Chinese religions there is no need to identify with only one or
with any and still maintain beliefs or practices. If one held a higher bar for measuring
Buddhists then only approximately 1.7 percent of the population had officially taken the
triple refuge as Buddhists, a number roughly one tenth the number of reported Buddhists
and similar in number to the amount of Daoists. On the other hand, of the ‘nonBuddhists’ “31 percent reported having at least one of Buddhist beliefs or participating in
at least one of Buddhist practices,”28 which could increase the number of Chinese
actively holding some Buddhist ideas to roughly 400 million. The same survey data that
puts Daoists at only 12 million showed that 173 million “had some kind of Daoist
practices… difficult to differentiate from popular religion.” Further, 215 million “believe
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in the existence of ancestral spirits,” 745 million “practice some form of ancestral
worship (such as attending and maintaining ancestral temples, venerating ancestor tablets,
etc.),” 145 million “have observed fengshui restrictions or consulted a fengshui master in
the last 12 months,” 141 million “believe in the existence of the god of wealth (caishen
财神), and 119 million have a picture or statue of the god of wealth at home or in their
workplace,” and 362 million “in the previous 12 months ‘practiced divination one way or
the other, including fortune-telling, face-reading, etc.’”29
With such large proportions of the population engaging in Daoist or popular
religious activities, perhaps the problem is not a lack of Daoists in China but rather a
difficulty with the category of religion that hides most Daoist activities behind selfidentification statistics. This would not be a problem except that it is internalized as part
of what Benedict Anderson terms the “fiction of the census” which makes it seem that
“everyone is in it, and that everyone has one — and only one — extremely clear place.
No fractions.”30 When people internalize this understanding, it reifies the notion that
Daoism is not popular in China. But another impulse beyond the difficulty of the
categories is to limit the significance or presence of these diffuse practices and beliefs
when discussing them with a foreigner. The difference between these statistics and the
affirmed realities of religion in China given by the teachers once again indicates that the
modern cultural revival is allowing high levels of activity on a local level, but keeping
this hidden from a wider audience.
Regardless, teachers were able to use their knowledge that Buddhism was more
popular to position its practices as more important to Chinese culture in terms of
29
30
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contemporary relevance. But this popularity did not amount to approval. Buddhism in
practice was viewed on similar terms as the Daoist masters. All were in agreement that
the majority of Chinese people have no religion, but many noted the importance of
praying to Guanyin or another Buddhist figure for many Chinese when they needed
something in their life, even as this was either negative or merely amusing. For both
traditions, their popularity was amongst older generations or in the countryside,
positioned away from youth and modernity. Jane gives a representative response:
I think in my opinion religions are… I don’t know how to say… like
Buddhism… some people in my family believe in Buddhism, so they go to
the temple to, um, in certain times to give money and to 磕头? (Kowtow,
bow and pray)… And when they have problems they will go to temple and
ask the Buddhas to help them or to save them. I don’t think that’s good, so
um… instantly I don’t really have a good impression to religions…
For Pam, who identified as coming from a small town in the countryside, Buddhism was
part of everyday life, but it was for the hopeless. When I asked if she had ever prayed to
Guanyin, she said no because she had never felt that hopeless before. Paul said similar
things, dismissing Chinese religion as mean or practical, not devout, and only taking
place in times of need. This is surely not a favorable impression of Buddhism. Buddhism,
like all religions, required careful navigation of ideas to properly communicate its place
in modern Chinese culture. To the extent it was still present, it was a disappearing part of
the past still lingering in the present, even if there is a revival happening. Two responses
show a particularly interesting place for Buddhism in modern China. Jane said,
But many people in countryside still believe in Buddhism… And this like,
this religion that was used by the Emperors or the people who have power
for so many years, so it has influence, great influence in Chinese society
for many years. So it has its position in China's culture... but… in modern
China, um, especially guided by our government, few people believe in
religion now. Our government told us… umm... uh… you know we learn
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politics? [Yeah] It's more about opinions of the government. So… I think
this, uh, fewer and fewer people are going to believe in Buddhism.
Jane sees the historical importance of Buddhism, but also the active use of education and
government ideology to push out beliefs. She was the only participant to mention the
government as actively educating against religion, but the younger generation all
reflected this bias in their understandings of modernity. Either religion is in the past or it
is in the backward presence of the past in the Chinese countryside.
Only one respondent seemed to take note of the fact that this festival may have
been in a tourist site and not in the countryside. To make sense of this image, Paul noted
the use of Buddhism to attract foreigners and investment, while stressing its
inauthenticity, because presumably religion was only authentic if rooted in the past.
This is a modern. Modern model. Modern model. Not from the traditional,
but it's ok if you show the stupid American people they don't know. (light
chuckle) [Well do Chinese people know that it's not real?] Yeah, this is
not… I talk about the... architecture, is modern China, made in the modern
China. It's not traditional. Cuz you can see it's very tall. In the, (sigh), I
don't know in the old (sigh) in the old China, we will… traditional… we
will have, but not like this. But it's ok if you want to show the foreign
people, they don't know. But I know… [You think it's good?] Yeah, and
uh I know you people like huge things. Oh oh oh! (mocking excitement of
foreigners seeing the statue) yeah... like that. You need that. [So this is for
us?] This is for you. Yeah… Why the government want to build this? Cuz
they want many visitors… to here… you know… to robust the economy,
local economy. [So this is just about tourism, it's not really, like religion is
not important, and it's not that important to culture?] No no no, it's
important, it's kind of important. Uh, you can see many people here, we
are very… happy. We are very… crazy, (chuckles) about this, so you can
many people are there, so… (Paul)
Paul positions the local Chinese as people with the proper, insider knowledge of the
tradition, and capable of manipulating the use of traditions to fool the foreigners. In this
way he is presenting a way of seeing Buddhism in modern China that is different from
the countryside, yet is inauthentic and a conscious ‘self-orientalizing’ which is meant to
- 111 -

attract the foreign gaze and the foreign dollar. His understandings appear to match the
government use of religion quite well in its use of local traditions as tourist attractions.
But this has the effect of making modern religious practice an attraction rather than an
aspect of modern belief or ideology.
While Buddhism is attractive to a foreign audience and that might make it a good
candidate for teaching in the classroom, the complexity means it, just like the other
religions, does not get taught in the classroom. Given the difficulty of positioning it in
modern China in a favorable light, and the negative view of religion for these young
teachers, Buddhism and all other religions are left out of curriculum or representations in
favor of other items imagined as pleasant for the foreign audience which do not contain
the potential for misunderstandings or negative connotations. The hesitations and sighs
from multiple teachers conform to this interpretation. Religion is a historical artifact with
much baggage, its presence in contemporary China is fraught, and foreign understandings
of religion are either inherently limited or mistaken. Thus, religion is not a good
component of Chinese culture for a foreign audience, even if the ideas are important to
their culture.
Confucianism
I provided teachers with three images that were related in some way to
Confucianism. The first Confucian image I showed was of some traditional Confucian
Virtues, ren 仁, li 礼, and yi 义. In scholarship these are traditionally translated as
benevolence, ritual propriety, and righteousness. This image was rated at a 9.5 out of 10
for cultural importance or value. The second image was of a statue of Confucius that had
been briefly controversial as it had been taken down from outside a museum near
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Tiananmen square.31 This was intended to see if there was any cultural difference
between the person and the values. It received a score of 9. The third image was of
ancestor worship which may or may not be interpreted as specifically Confucian. It also
received a score of 9. Teachers located all of these images near the ‘core’ of Chinese
culture.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Confucianism represents a middle ground between the
categories of religion and philosophy and is not recognized as one of the five official
(legal) religions. Chinese people almost unanimously see it as a social philosophy. This
distinction is very important for how one treats both Confucius and the requirements of
identifying as Confucian and remains an actively debated topic. Teachers almost all
spontaneously brought in the terminology of religion and philosophy, which
demonstrates Confucianism’s complicated, borderline status in the conceptual world of
religion. After bringing up religion, Paul said that it was not a religion because Confucius
was not perfect, contrasted him to Jesus, and said that his ideas about women were bad,
"but most of his saying are good, are very useful, even today….” Lucy, a teacher of a
dedicated culture class at a high school, noted the absence of gods and strict codes,
saying, “I think every religion has gods and you have to do certain things and obey
certain rules, but not for Confucius.”32 Emily, a Chinese teacher outside of the CI,
struggled to know which words to use when talking about the image of Confucius.
What I should call this? It's a philosophy, or concept, or ideas? Which
word should I use? [All of these work. Principles?] Oh principles, yeah, I
like this. I like the principles, but I read a lot of things, not a lot of things,
31
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some things about this person. Oh, he's definitely a good person! But what
he taught…. I think the principles are good, if you take away the emperor,
authority, or money, or relig... oh no I shouldn't say the religion, maybe
the religion things. I like all the principles, but I don't like people use it to
do other things. To take power, to take authority, to earn money, do you
understand? [But you do think of religion when you think of him?] I don't.
I think of principles, or teachings, but not religions.
Clearly the terminology matters, and the available terms determine the degree to
which Confucius or Confucianism can be seen as a good part of Chinese culture. Many
settle on terms like principles, philosophy, ideas, and explicitly create a space away from
religion. This matters because teachers understand and express religion as something
Chinese people do not have, but Confucian thought is known as the core of Chinese
culture and history. As seen below there are negative components of religion, and Emily
noted some of them, such as authority, money, things outside of a beneficial philosophy.
But religion also contains good components, and if the foreigner asks about religion and
Chinese morality, they will note Confucianism as similar to religion in the sense of
morality. Lucy says, “Maybe people say Chinese people don’t have religion, but the
philosophy of Confucius actually influence them a lot… just something I read.” But
unless asked, most would not discuss it in depth, either because foreigners would find it
boring or because they have difficulty navigating its place in Chinese culture. They all
noted its importance, but historically or in abstract contemporary ways, and only after
labored consideration.
When confronted with the image of ancestor worship, teachers usually relate it
simply to family. Confucian ritual was important in Chinese history and in imperial cults,
but their discussion of these rituals reflects the historically recent shift away from ritual
and towards a simple ethic of family respect. However, this shift seemed easy for some
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and difficult for others. Eventually they all remarked on family being important in
Chinese culture. Chrystal had this to say, full of excitement,
Ah! This is what I was telling you about! Ah! Paying respects to your
ancestors. This is very important (laughs). We really attach importance to
respecting our ancestors…. If they are going to return home you have to
give them something to eat…. But Chinese people will believe this.
Particularly people from ancient times. People before. People today
also… even if they know their ancestors haven’t returned or can’t come
back, they still will think, ‘Ai ya! My ancestors are very important!’
Paul likewise expressed the importance of family, though sadly as he remembered his
grandfather,
It show our emotional too... (heavy sigh, getting sad) I'm sorry, I think
about my grandpa… Yeah, show our... our miss them, our emotion to the
dead people. Cuz… show the family sense. They are our family members,
they are our dad or grandpa, grandma, they are very important people for
us. So it can reflect our heart, heart, from this picture. Oh and our family
sense, from the other side, you can see.
The feeling for ancestors is still very important, but as Chrysal’s response indicates, the
practices are pushed to the past, with the present only maintaining the feeling. The spirits
are gone, but the spirit remains. However, it is significant that ancestor worship was
never used to teach foreigners about family sense, and all of the Confucian virtues were
discussed simply as kindness, manners, family sense, and harmony, things which can
hardly be said to be specific to Confucianism. If I had known nothing of Confucianism, I
would not have learned much specifically about the tradition from these interviews, and
that seems to explain in some way the lack of Confucius in the classroom. While most
talked about principles and influence and his effects on all East Asian civilizations, the
problem of teaching him in the classroom was best summed up by Peggy, a CI teacher at
a High School:
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What these three words represent is very, very important in our blood, in
our culture, but people do not understand these words, they are too... these
words represent too many things. They already in our blood, so we just
take it as, take it for granted, we just do not explain it, and we don't say it,
but it's… in our blood.
Confucianism is an ethnic identity. It’s a symbol. It’s a complex and multifaceted
part of Chinese culture with both good and bad aspects, bordering on religion, yet more
of a replacement for religion than a religion itself. It is most likely the core of Chinese
and all East Asian culture. But it is beyond the level of early students that they teach and
could not be communicated well. When it is taught, all historical baggage is stripped and
the words used are kindness, manners, family feeling, or harmony. In this way, in the
eyes of one teacher, Jane, a CI English teacher in a middle school, Americans were better
Confucians than the average Chinese person.
Christianity and Islam
Christianity and Islam fell furthest outside of a Chinese cultural identity as a
result of their foreign origin and either negative connotations or irrelevance in the modern
context. I provided one image of Chinese Catholic Christians at a service and one image
of ethnic Muslims at prayer. The Christian image provided some confusion because it did
not have enough easily recognizable imagery for the teachers who were not familiar with
the Catholic tradition. Three thought it was people dressed in traditional Han garb and
identified it as of middle importance which might have helped its score, showing the way
their expectations of Chinese culture did not include Christianity, but most eventually
identified it correctly and Christianity received a score of 3.3/10 for cultural importance.
This was the second lowest score with Islam receiving the lowest score of 2.8.
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These low scores show that a combination of ethnic identity and a bias towards
historical rather than contemporary relevance of religion decrease the value of these
foreign traditions. Actual contemporary relevance can be difficult to determine because
statistics on religious affiliation in China are considered fairly unreliable due to a large
degree of underground religious activity outside of the purview of the government and
surveys often under-count ethnic minorities due to the location of surveys. With estimates
of just over 30 percent religious adherence in contemporary China,33 official estimates
from 2008 put Christianity at around 3 to 4 percent of the population and Islam at roughly
1.5 percent. Most religious demographers argue that Christians in unofficial churches,
‘house churches,’ roughly double those estimates to 7 or 8 percent of the population,
making it quite a large presence.
Mirroring statistics and news stories about growing numbers of Christians in
China, many of my informants were aware of an increasing Christian presence in China
and if they viewed it as important to Chinese culture, this was the reason for the
religion’s increased cultural importance. Jessica gave the single ‘very important’ score
for Christianity and her reason for this score was that all religion is important. However,
for most interviewees Christianity was foreign, unpopular, and churches were like
museums. Even if they acknowledged growing popularity, it was not truly Chinese
culture. A sample response is Abby’s, who said, after 15 seconds of hesitation,
I don't think it's Chinese culture. It’s not. I think it's not, because, um… I
think it’s in a church, right? Yeah, so I, um… I know that China has some
people who believe in Catholicism or Christianity, but this isn’t really an
original part of China. For China… Of course today there may be people
33
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in China who also believe it, but for traditional China people believed in
Buddhism and Daoism. Yeah. [Ok, so not important?] Yeah. Uh… It’s not
a representative part of Chinese culture.
Abby acknowledges the presence of Christians in China, but not as part of an
authentic Chinese culture, and she goes to Buddhism and Daoism for Chinese religious
identity, positioning this identity in the past. Morality was one way that Christianity, as a
part of religion generally, could have value in Chinese culture and this sometimes
influenced the score. However, Islam was not viewed in such positive ways.
Islam received the lowest of all scores and informants consistently spoke of it as
the image least appropriate for a foreign audience. It was a religion inseparable from
ethnic groups, whether identified as Hui or Uighur. The complexities and tensions were
unavoidable and the teachers would rather not have been confronted with the image.
When asked if any image should have been removed, it was this one. Its value for
representation was at best in multiculturalism, as expressed by Abby:
I don't really understand their culture, and I didn't have many Muslim
friends, so I... 90% isn’t ethnic minorities, it’s Han, so they won't
understand that. But you can learn from them the multifaceted nature of
Chinese culture (中国文化的多样性). China has lots of ethnic minorities,
they will all have their own beliefs. For example, Han Chinese will have
Confucian thought and Buddhism, these things in our lives.
At best Islam is a little known or little understood part of China which could show
the different cultures within China. At worst it is a complicated issue that foreigners have
the wrong understanding of in China. Interestingly, Abby again brings up indigenous
traditions to compare and provide an alternative religious identity, though this time
leaving out Daoism. Paul criticized both Islam and foreigners’ understanding of Islam
within China (including the author’s, as we had discussed this together before), noting the
failure and bias of foreign media and the “double standard” by which we judge China.
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The news, foreign TV, you come from the BBC, CNN, ABC, like that, not
very have a positive attitude when they report this in China…. So you
don't have a very positive attitude about this. So I will not show this the
first time... Maybe if we are have a deep... deep, deeper relationship,
develop... when we talk about this I will tell them the truth, but not the
first time. We don't, they don't want to know. They don't need to know!,
the most things. They just know uh, the common things, very popular
things about China. Like this, like this (shows pictures he likes). Oh they
are good, they are friendly, like that… yeah.
Not only are Muslims a negative presence in contemporary China, but they
present a bad image of China to the West, which breeds misunderstandings. Despite
having some value as part of an ethnic minority, given the complications and distance
from the main Han culture, Islam has little value in cultural education and would not
make the curriculum. Considering the issues of constructing a cultural identity for China,
this does show how members of the Chinese nation do not fit as truly ‘Chinese’ and
engage in activities that belong to a different culture. If it must be said, this is hardly part
of a communist ideology. What it does reflect is the complication of constructing a
modern, national cultural identity and positioning these religions, very much present
within China and growing in importance, within a cultural identity for presentation to a
foreign audience.
Conclusion
This section has attempted to show the considerations that go into crafting
teachers’ and official CI presentations of Chinese culture for a foreign audience. I have
identified three main criteria that go into judging the relevance of cultural components in
international presentations: historical importance, contemporary relevance, and foreigner
knowledge or interest. The aspects of culture that teachers easily confronted or happily
taught all had high levels of each component. The religious cultural components were
perceived to have deficiency in one or more of these aspects, and I argue that the issues
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are related to the broader conflict that arises with the discourse of modernity in Chinese
cultural construction as seen in previous chapters. This discourse creates a conflict
between historical culture and contemporary culture with religion fitting poorly in
contemporary China. Further, as teachers imagine a foreign audience with little prior
knowledge of China, the religious or philosophical ideas may be too difficult for them. If
the foreigners are thought to have knowledge or interest it is usually imagined as a biased
understanding due to the American political media, so as they imagine the concerns of
their foreign audience it is difficult to discuss it.
The personal understandings of teachers in this study utilize and fit within the
modern, enlightenment dichotomies of religion/philosophy, traditional/modern,
superstitious/rational, and authentic/inauthentic. These four dichotomies work together to
determine the uncertain worth of religion within Chinese cultural presentations for a
foreign audience. CI teachers’ understandings of religion work within the same
framework that CI official presentations do, often using the same strategies employed by
thinkers during the National Essence movements or by CTA presentations that deconstructs religious traditions and selects the aspects that are most suitable for the
modern world. All religions deemed authentic are unanimously considered at least
somewhat important to Chinese culture, but usually not as important as the underlying
philosophies nor the uncontroversial aspects of culture such as food, music, and
traditional clothing. Those religions deemed inauthentic, Christianity or Islam, are often
valued the least as Chinese culture.
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CONCLUSION
From the early interactions with the Western cultural other, Chinese intellectuals
sought to reposition indigenous religious and political institutions within the Chinese
state to ensure the continued strength and sovereignty of their nation. The earliest forms
of this effort, seen in the views of the Self Strengtheners, hoped to maintain Confucian
norms and Chinese spiritual understandings while adopting Western science and
technology. But in the developing cultural discourse of China, the radical iconoclasts won
out, advocating rupture with the past and replacement of religious forms of authority with
secular ones. In the contested development of a modern Chinese cultural identity, the
traditional religious structures, institutions, and understandings were pushed onto the
margins of society, kept separate from political authority, and made the constant object of
suspicion.
In this thesis I have shown the impact of a previously non-existent cultural
discourse in China and its continuing role in marginalizing previously integral
components of Chinese society. In advocating a modern cultural identity, those who
belonged to religious traditions had to reformulate their institutions and beliefs to fit the
terms of the discourse. They formed national organizations, eliminated superstitious
beliefs and practices that did not fit the ideal rational form of religion, and legitimized
themselves through appeal to secular values such as health, charity, and high culture
forms like calligraphy. This does not mean that the previous beliefs or practices were
completely eliminated, but rather that they were relegated to an uncertain legal status and
removed from official presentations of religion to an international audience.
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These changes, rooted in a discourse of modernity and culture, remain to this day.
They influence the presentations that the Chinese Taoist Association and the Confucius
Institutes construct for a wider audience. For this reason, the CTA constructs media that
subjects their tradition to open academic study, deconstructs their tradition into secular
cultural components, de-emphasizes the role of divinity, and hides nearly an entire part of
their tradition in media presentations. While the Daoist tradition continues to thrive
within the new safe space of “traditional culture,” they play by the rules defined by
national political authorities and the goals of modernity. This dictates the sanitized
version of Daoism presented, one that stands outside of local communities even as they
continue to have an active role in ritual and superstitious practices within them. Thus, the
role of the present cultural revival in China allows local forms of religious practice, such
as popular religion, to achieve more openness and legitimacy, but due to the terms of the
discourse it does not give those acting within these local spaces a visible role in larger
international presentations of the Daoist tradition.
As these methods of presenting religion as a Chinese cultural component are quite
complicated and fraught with potential misunderstandings, the CI presentations and
classroom lessons largely avoid religious traditions altogether. When they do appear, they
are limited to articulated secular values on a touch-screen or discussed by Western
scholars as active components of the Chinese past, but not their present. Their highest
level of cultural value is as historical components, but their place in modern society is
largely denied or devalued. The aspects of religion that are most central to Chinese
culture, indeed often composing the very heart of a Chinese identity according to CI
teachers, are usually defined as vague cultural values or ethical understandings that
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teachers have difficulty articulating. These cultural values can act as emblems of cultural
identity, like the statue of Confucius in a CI space or a yin-yang symbol, but to this extent
they are emptied of articulated content, separated from any complicated religious
heritage, and tied almost entirely to an essentialized ethnicity or nationality. The actual
things that CI teachers teach avoid these complicated topics in favor of the simple and
colorful.
By analyzing the presentations made by these large national cultural organizations
I have attempted to show not only the continued importance of the relatively recent term
“culture,” but also the parameters that define this cultural discourse and the effects this
discourse has on Chinese religions as components of Chinese culture.
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